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RENN, MICHAEL T., Ed.D. An Analyis of Board of Education/ 
Superintendent Relationships in the Area of Public School 
Finance. (1986) Directed by or. E. Lee Bernick.. 139 pp. 
It was the purpose of this study to examine the rela-
tionships between members of boards of education and public 
school superintendents in the area of school finance. It is 
our contention that these two sets of actors are at the 
heart of American public education and that an illumination 
of the interrelationships surrounding them is significant. 
Relationships between boards of education and superin-
tendents were examined in only one area of interest, school 
finance. This area is identified in the literature and 
recognized through experience as a facilitator of other 
educationa 1 endeavors. 
The basis for the study was data collected through the 
administration of a questionnaire to all local district school 
superintendents in the state of North Carolina. The ques-
tionnaire involved respondents ranking levels of involvement 
on 29 areas of financial responsibility. The response rate 
was in excess of 90%. 
We found that superintendents have a different percep-
tion of their own responsibility in school finance as 
opposed to the responsibility of board members. They see 
themselves as being more actively involved in a broader 
range of financial areas than board members. Superinten-
dents also delineated multiple areas of responsibility in 
school finance rather than creating a simple dichotomous 
division. In addition, th·ey perceived their own performance 
as being closer to what it "ought to be" than that of their 
board members. There were no differences in the perceptions 
of superintendents in financial matters when considering 
three selected demographic differences. 
Replication of the study in differing geographic areas 
as well as from different perspectives was suggested for 
further study. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, America's public schools have been 
seen as her strength. While the most recent years have 
brought criticism of public education and even an occasional 
suggestion that a system of privately funded institutions 
could better and more efficiently educate America's youth, 
there is little doubt that the educational system has per-
formed well. However, this is not to imply that there are 
no weaknesses. It would be reasonable to imagine that even 
those who level critic ism at the schools understand what the 
"noble experiment" is all about. No other nation has 
attempted, on such a grand scale, to educate the masses. 
America is a nation where not just those who were blessed 
with being financially well-born, not simply those who had 
elevated intellectual ability and intended to pursue uni-
versity study, and not just those who, by accident of birth, 
came to our shores with the "proper" skin color religious 
convictions but every child is endowed with the right to a 
proper education. This goal of creating a literate citizenry 
was not just a whim or "luck of the draw" but rather an idea 
straight out of a larger political philosophy and tradition. 
Schools in America were not founded on a basis that was 
confined only to intellectual development for development's 
sake; they were created with purpose, purpose larger than 
the schools themselves. That purpose, of course, was focused 
on what we have come to call a "way of life" but which is, 
more technically, a political philosophy and system: 
democracy. The founding fathers were cognizant of the fact 
that if individual citizens were to express their desires 
and if these grass root commands were to be used to guide the 
republic, then the common man must be prepared for such 
responsibi 1 i ty. America's public schools were created in 
this democratic tradition and, through a set of goals that 
were centered on the realization of national literacy, were 
to perpetuate that tradition. 
With this national democratic ideal as a backdrop, the 
governance of America's schools has often begged the atten-
tion of the general public as well as of the country's educa-
tional professionals. That "free public schools" are essen-
tia 1 to the existence of American democracy has been a given 
as schools were, and continue to be, used to assimilate and 
to transfer sociaHzing knowledge to young citzens. However, 
equally of interest to us and to scholars in many disciplines, 
is the way that America has chosen to govern the schools 
themselves and whether the institution that has been given 
the task of transfering the democratic ideal is actually 
utilizing that ideal in practice. 
The historical fact is clear, America has chosen a 
cooperative, two-pronged system of school governance. 
Interestingly enough, this same idea is akin to that found 
in the larger governmental arena as one branch of government 
is asked to "check and balance" another. One "branch" of 
this dual governance system in schools is the "lay" control 
provided by boards of education. Such boards were, at the 
outset of American public education, the only governing 
bodies, and these boards specified to teachers what they 
expected in their schools. The whole idea of governance 
being "close to the people" .was realized when the representa-
tives of the people were in direct control of schools. The 
democratic ideal was totally achieved with popularly elected 
boards of education. If, on the other hand, boards of 
education were appointed by other elected officials, then 
something less than pure representative government resulted. 
But, as the schools and the nation grew, the operation of 
the educational process [became more complex and time-consuming. 
Lay boards, whether ele~ted or appointed, were no longer 
willing or able to be i~ direct control and felt a need to 
hire a "professional" to aid in the governance of their 
schools. The entrance of the professional administrator did 
relieve boards of the day-to-day operation of schools but it 
also had a real effect on the "ownership" of those schools. 
This shared ownership led to the aforementioned second "branch" 
of the dual governance system. The appearance of the super-
intendency added an element of governance that was one more 
step removed from direct popular control and, as a result, 
the lay/professional dichotomy that presently draws great 
attention was established. Superintendents and boards of 
education were now in positions to compete for influence in 
educational governance. 
Democratic influence does not end with the nature of 
those who make decisions about the governance of schools; 
it extends to how those decisions are made. In addition to 
the electoral process often being used to select those who 
provide lay control of education, there are those issues that 
are put directly to the people. Bond issues, referenda, 
and, in the most extreme examples, even direct approval of 
school district budgets are a part of school governance. 
Democratic ideals are evident throughout the processes used 
in the governance of America•s schools; and although partisan 
politics are largely avoided, the process is a profoundly 
political one. 
Within the political arena surrounding the school gov-
ernance function, a stumbling block has emerged--one that 
has its beginnings at the creation of the dual governance 
system mentioned above. American school districts are 
governed in concert by lay boards of education that are, in 
varying degrees, responsible to the peeple and professional 
superintendents who depend on their theoretical understand-
ing of what should be done in schools. The potential for 
conflict is clear as both struggle to determine their proper 
roles in the concerted effort. The professional has at the 
center of his/her interest what he/she sees as what "ought" 
to be happening in schools and yet is responsible to the 
board of education as an employee to his/her employer. The 
lay board member may have a personal opinion on an issue, 
but--possibly more importantly--he/she has at the center of 
his/her interest what his/her constituents think "ought" to 
be happening in schools. Tension between these sometimes 
competing interests, and therefore between roles, is a 
reality in most cases and certainly a surprise in none. The 
political process which involves a contest of interests is 
the result and is often accompanied by discomfort and insecur-
ity for board members and superintendents alike. 
The governance of schools, therefore, is clearly a 
political undertaking, with conflicting roles existing among 
those who are to govern as well as among those who are to be 
governed. However, while the nation has traditionally been 
wi 11 ing to admit, has even been boastful of, its national 
political traditions, it has not been willing to admit the 
political reality of school governance. Schools have been 
seen as institutions that need to be "above politics" yet 
the reality has always been that they are rooted in the 
democratic/political tradition and, most likely, will 
remain so. 
The role conflict that arises between lay boards and 
professiona 1 administrators has, most often, been denied 
and replaced instead by a false sense of security based only 
on a desire to avoid conflict and the creative tensions that 
it can yield. Avoidance behavior and denial have been the 
rule as "playing politics" with our children has become a 
pox to be avoided. It would seem strange that a process 
revered in the governance of a nation would be so despised 
and suspect as a process of public school governance. 
This study is focused on the political interaction that 
transpires between the superintendent and the board of 
education. The relationship between lay boards and their 
professional administrators is a fragile one that receives a 
great deal of public and media interest. Board meetings often 
provide poblicized examples of the difficulty of these rela-
tionships and the public nature of these meetings adds the 
tension that comes with the concern of being observed. 
There is no single relationship between boards and 
superintendentst rather, a series of relationships is formed 
in regard to a great number of issues and interests. While 
an attempt could be made to study all of the various rela-
tionships that exist, we felt that a single area of interest, 
public school finance, best captures many of the conflicts 
that surround board/ superintendent relationships. School 
finance is profoundly pervasive in the operation of schools. 
Little else seems to yield more vivid opinions than how we 
distribute scarce financial resources to serve the needs of 
students. In addition, school finance can be seen as a 
catalyst for other decision areas such as curriculum, per-
sonne 1, and administrative organization. Without the channel-
ing of appropriate funds into these other areas, they remain 
thoughts and ideas unfulfilled, waiting to be activated by 
dollars spent. 
Significance of the Present Study 
There is little doubt that boards of education and 
superintendents are the two key actors in governance and 
control of public schools. While there is a significant 
amount of literature in the field of education that comments 
on board/superintendent relations, it tends to be anecdotal. 
Moreover, there has been little theoretical analysis or 
comparison with models of democratic control from outside 
the field of education. A combination of a lack of creation 
of models for the board/superintendent relationship within 
education and the lack of comparison with models from without, 
leaves the interaction between these key actors to chance. 
Research that seeks to use proven models in other fields to 
determine if they apply to education may provide valuable 
insight into our understanding of board/superintendent 
relations. We feel that the significance of this relationship 
deserves additional analysis that can lead to improving the 
understanding of the interaction that is to serve students. 
The use of school finance as an area of focus for the 
study of board/superintendent relations has been commented 
on earlier. Although the distribution of scarce financial 
resource shapes the educational system, there is virtually 
no literature that examines the board/superintendent relation-
ship in this profoundly important area. This study will 
provide some basis for beginning to analyze this important 
element of school operation. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter I of the study introduces the topic under con-
sideration providing both purpose and what we see as the 
significance of the undertaking. Some historical background 
is also provided. 
Chapter II is a review of the related literature on board 
of education/superintendent relations. An effort is made to 
summarize what others have said and to relate this to our 
specific concerns. Although little is available on board/ 
superintendent relationships in the area of school finance, 
the general area of board/superintendent relations is a fer-
tile one. Effort will be made to critique the literature as 
it is reviewed. In addition, parallels will be drawn between 
and among varying positions within the literature and com-
parisons with models of interaction outside education will 
be made. 
In Chapter III our methodology will be discussed. A 
definition of critical terms will be offered as well as an 
examination of research methods. We will discuss how we 
intend to examine the areas in question and the statistical 
measures to be employed. Hypotheses will be cast that will 
be tested as the research methodology is utilized to examine 
the data gathered. 
Analysis of data will be discussed in Chapter IV. our 
findings will be outlined in addition to an explanation of 
how we arrived at those findings. Comparative references 
wi 11 be made to the work of others. 
Chapter V will contain summary, conclusions, and recom-
mendations for further study. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
l 0 
As we begin this study of the relationship between public 
school superintendents and members of boards of education, 
it is important that we understand that our examination is 
one of roles and players and not one of specific persons. 
Rather, as in all conceptual studies, conclusions reached 
may be of consequence in developing a general understanding 
of the interaction between tile key actors in America's public 
schools. Before we begin talking specifically about either 
of the key actors, it may serve us to examine the theoretical 
constructs that form the framework for the social interaction 
between them. These constructs, and the constraints they 
impose, must be understood in order that the relationships 
under study can be properly analyzed. In examining social 
constructs for interaction, we will be drawing on two general 
areas of sociological research, one is what has been termed 
"role theory" and the other is the specific work of Erving 
Goffman in a book entitled The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life. Each has the capacity for increasing our 
ability to take both superintendents and boards out of a 
theoretical context and place them, as Goffman might say 
it, "on life's stage." 
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Central to the understanding of "role theory" is, of 
course, some agreement on the definition of the term "role." 
The term has at its base a theatrica 1 origin and was not 
commonly used to describe a sociologically technical concept 
unti 1 the 1930's. The concept of "role" is one developed 
in sociological analysis and has been central in linking the 
functioning of elements of the social order with the charac-
teristics and behavior of those who make it up. In the 
19 DO's in his work Behind Our Masks, Robert Ezra Park noted 
that "everyone is always and everywhere more or less con-
sciously playing a role. . It is in these roles that we 
know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves" 
(Park, 1926, p. 58). Our definition of role is, then, a 
relatively simple one: "a role is those behaviors charac-
teristic of one or more persons in a context" (Biddle, 1979, 
p. 4 • Roles, then, dictate what we are in the eyes of 
others; they look at us and they see our roles. The Chinese 
philosopher Confucius may have sad it more clearly: "the 
ruler rules, the minister ministers, the father fathers, 
and the son sons." Given this definition, it is easy enough 
to at least begin to imagine what is denoted with regard 
to roles by the terms "superintendent" and "board member." 
As sociologists began looking at the methods used by 
individual members of society to gather clues as to how to 
behave in varying interactive situations, they also began 
12 
developing the concept of role theory. There were three 
significant theorists who provided the lion's share of the 
early thought and research in this area: George Herbert 
Mead, Jacob Moreno, and Ralph Linton. Mead was the real 
forerunner as he wrote and taught at the University of Chicago 
from 1911 to 1925. His work, Mind, Self, and Society (1934), 
was visionary in observing "that in mature social behavior 
the individual works out his role by imaginatively taking 
the role of the other" (Encyclopedia of Social Research, 
p. 552). This idea led to the contention that "articulation 
between the roles played by partners in interaction deter-
mines whether interaction is harmonious and productive" 
(Encyclopedia of Social Research, p. 552). In the late 
1930's Moreno utilized Mead's ideas and became best known 
for his work in the area of behavior change, speaking often 
of the differentiation betwen "role-playing" and "role-
taking." "Role playing may be considered as an experimental 
procedure, a method of learning to perform roles more ade-
quately. In contrast with role-playing, role-taking is an 
attitude already frozen in the behavior of a person 11 (Biddle 
& Edwin, 1966, p. 7) Two years later Linton proposd a classic 
distinction between "status" and "role." 
A status (position) as distinct from the person who 
may occupy it, is simply a collection of rights and 
duties .•. a role represents the dynamic aspect 
of a status. The individual is socially assigned a 
status and occupies it with relation to other statuses. 
When he puts the rights and responsibilities which 
constitute the status into effect, he is performing 
a role. (Biddle & Edwin, 1966, p. 7) 
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Clearly, the positions of board member and superintendent 
carry with them the weight of role expectation, there being 
generally accepted, although sometimes conflicting, sets of 
behaviors recognized for each. It is of consequence that we 
study the relationship between the roles of these key actors 
by utilizing what began with Mead, Moreno, and Linton and 
what has, more recently, been called "role theory." 
Role Theory 
Role theory "is a science concerned with the study of 
behaviors that are characteristic of persons within contexts 
and with various processes that presumably produce, explain, 
or are affected by those behaviors" (Biddle, 1979, p. 4). 
It is this capacity for affecting behaviors that makes role 
theory of interest in the study of board of education/super-
intendent relations. The role and the perception of the 
role held by others develop simultaneously and, for all 
practical purposes, reality is re-created. The understanding 
{or misunderstanding) of role by all of the appropriate orga-
nizational actors plays a very real part in that organiza-
tion 1 s future. "Many organizational studies have demonstrated 
that lack of clarity and consensus in role conceptions i~- ·a 
factor in reducing organizational effectiveness and morale" 
(Encyclopedia of Social Research, p. 553). 
There are sever a 1 other concepts within the genera 1 
area of role theory that have appropriate application to 
14 
board of education/superintendent relations. The first of 
these concepts is termed "role persistence." This is the 
general tendency of roles to be described as staying the same 
regardless of changes in actors. 
First, when an actor leaves the group and is replaced 
by another, there is the tendency to allocate to the 
new member the role played by the one who leaves. 
Second, if one actor changes roles, there is a ten-
dency for another actor to make a compensatory change 
of roles in order to maintain the original role 
structure. (Encyclopedia of Social Research, p. 554) 
Thus roles persist, even though board members and superin-
tendents come and go, and there is much research that docu-
ments that this penchant towards mobility creates tendencies 
that have a powerful effect on those who govern schools. The 
phenomenon militates against real change in governance in an 
area of endeavor that is markedly changing. As education 
has rushed to maintain pace with societal change, role per-
sistence has been a real complicator to the establishment of 
stable board/superintendent relations and to good governance, 
if stability is reguired for that condition. 
Role persistence is complicated by a concept called 
"legitimate expectation." "There is a tendency for stabilized 
roles to be assigned the character of legitimate expectations, 
implying that deviation from expectation is a breach of rules 
or violation of trust" (Encyclopedia of Social Research, 
p. 554). Enormous bad feeling can arise from such a viola-
tion in that all of the actors involved feel that they "know" 
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what the other is to do. Legitimate expectation can be 
built by what has come to be a "customary" pattern and yet 
it can be overturned as this position is denied by other 
actors. Once a pattern is established, whether positive 
or negative, the expectation arises and future behavior 
toward that person will be jaundiced by past behaviors. As 
is obvious, working to improve negative feelings persisted 
as the dominant expectation for present and future behaviors. 
As if th€! difficulties that can arise from the concepts 
already mentioned were not enough, there are other confound-
ing factors. Roles, as we have already seen, do not exist 
in a vacuum; they exist with regard to other roles. However, 
the reality of role interaction and of board/superintendent 
relations goes even further. A third determinant of action 
is that of the organizational setting. Organizational set-
tJ.ngs supply both dl.rectl.on and constraint to all of the 
processes mentJ.oned pre J.ously and therefore these processes 
are brought J.nto even m re complex interrelationships. The 
organJ.zatJ.on's goals can tend to determl.ne the crJ.terl.a for 
role dJ.fferentJ.atJ.on, legl.tl.macy of expectation, and the 
1 ike. Concepts such as ''status" of roles emerge as the 
organization assigns "worth" to roles and "to the extent to 
which roles are incorporated into an organizational setting, 
their persistence is intensified through tradition and for-
malization" (Encyclopedia of Social Research, p. 555). The 
16 
result is a conflict between informal role expectations and 
those that have been made formal by the organization's edict. 
A third party in the person of the organization itself has 
been established and achieving role congruence is now even 
more diificult to accomplish. 
While it is evident that the processes governing 
schools are made more difficult by the role expectations and 
the various conflicts surrounding the theory, it should not 
. be forgotten that the individuals, in playing out their roles, 
may also suffer. Not unlike the physical desire to survive, 
sociological actors also strive to avoid personal damage. 
Alleviation of what is usually called "role strain" is a 
significant motivation of all social players. "Role strain 
comes largely from failure of many sociological processes to 
function adequately, so as to leave unclear, incomplete, and 
contradictory elements in a role" (Encyclopedia of Social 
Research, p. 556). Those who experience such strain make 
alterations in their behaviors so as to lessen or cope with 
the negative effects that can result. Again, the board member 
and/or superintendent are prime candidates for the phenom-
enon, and relations between them can be significantly colored 
by the strain. 
Variation on Role Theory 
Sociologist Erving Goffman has provided a variation on 
role theory that can lend a helping hand as we study 
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relationships between boards of education and their super-
intendents. In his book The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life he utilizes a perspective that parallels a theatrical 
performance as he considers 
the way in which the individual in ordinary work 
situations presents himself and his activity to others, 
the ways in which he guides and controls the impression 
they form of him, and the kinds of things he may or 
may not do while sustaining his performance before 
them. {Goffman, 1959, p. xi) 
Goffman stays away from socio-technical description and 
explanation and utilizes a more simplistic less jargon-prone 
(less discipline-centered) analysis. His point is relatively 
simple: that contextual situations can be more readily 
controlled if an individual is aware of the social environment 
and able to present him/herself in the intended light. The 
idea clarifies and extends that of role theory and suggests 
that while role is not unimportant, that what is perceived 
of those in the role is equally as viable as a vehicle. for 
control. Goffman says that "when an individual appears in 
the presence of others, there will usually be some reason for 
him to mobilize his activity so that it will convey the 
impression to others which it is in his interest to convey" 
(p. 4). Therefore, interactions that take place between 
board members and superintendents can be defined in part 
by the way an individual appears during the .situation. These 
situational, contextual clues can convey any number of 
messages and there are those who seem virtually unable to 
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lessen their own "presence." These individuals may not be 
aware of their capacity in creating context but, more likely, 
they have become expert at calculated unintentionality 
thereby increasing their ability to manipulate the behavior 
of others and, therefore, of appropriate situations. These 
ideas are especially powerful in an interactive situation 
such as board of education/superintendent relations. 
When we allow that the individual projects a defini-
tion of the situation when he appears before others, 
we must also see that the others, however passive 
their role may seem to be, will themselves eff-
ciently project a definition of the situation by virtue 
of any lines of action they initiate to him. (Goffman, 
1959. p. 9) 
This type of interaction is a variation on give and take 
where each "actor" is expected to suppress his/her immediate 
heartfelt feelings, attempting to convey a view of the 
situation that the other authors will be, at least, temporarily 
able to accept. Goff man refers to this tendency as "working 
consensus" and, as we shall demonstrate later in the study, 
it has direct parallels to what political scientists have 
termed the "harmony model" of board/superintendent relations. 
The acceptance of the establishment of a "working consensus" 
by accepting the definitional claims of others is important 
in that this initial information is the basis on which the 
situation is defined and lines of responsive action are 
first created. Obviously, Goff man's ideas would presuppose 
that "first impressions" are important, yet they go far 
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deeper. They imply that seizing and holding the initiative 
are important and therein lies the competitive struggle 
between board members and superintendents who often, simul-
taneously, are attempting to do just that. 
Continuing the drama tal urgical parallel, Goff man speaks 
of additional theatrical elements. He states that "a perform-
ance may be defined as all the activity of a given partici-
pant on a given occasion which serves to influence, in any 
way, any of the other participants" (Goff man, 19 59, p. 15) . 
"Parts," "routines," "settings,'' and other stage-related 
terms are coined as he asks the reader to buy into his 
analogy. However, he does make clear a point that would 
not necessarily follow the dramatic route. There might be 
confusion regarding motivation; an assumption that all per-
formances are cynical and out for self-interest could 
be made, but Goffman does not believe that this is true. 
While the "acting" is most often purposeful, the motivation 
can be altruistic, like physicians giving placebos to patients 
who "need" them. So, a player can be "out for himself" but 
can also gravitate towards being totally taken in by his/her 
own performance, really believing it as reality. 
It is at this point that the connection between Goffman' s 
work and other sociologists such as Park can be detected. 
Park establishes the connection as he says, 
It is probably no mere historical accident that the 
word person, in its first meaning, is a mask ••• 
In a sense, and in so far as this mask represents the 
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conception we have formed of ourselves--the role that 
we are striving to live up to--this mask is our truer 
self, the self that we would like to be. In the end 
our conception of our role becomes second nature and 
an integral part of our personality. We come into the 
world as indi victuals, achieve character, and become 
persons. (Park, 1950, p. 249) 
If we are to place any faith in sociological analysis, 
we can assume that the dynamics of interaction outlined by 
Park, Mead, Goffman, and others would be active with regard 
to the board/superintendent relationship. While this type 
of analysis has, to this point, assumed a somewhat egocentric 
stance between actors, in our case board members and super-
intendents, Goff man does offer another insight into the rela-
tionship. He uses the term "performance team" to refer to 
"any set of individuals who cooperate in staging a single 
routine" {Goffman, 1959, p. 79). Therefore, there is a pas-
sibility that, at least publicly, boards and superintendents 
could act as a team to come to grips with decisions that are 
to be made. This "professional" stance is one often espoused 
by superintendents and will be spoken to later in this 
study. 
Boards and superintendents are actors in a social dynamic 
and sociological analysis can help to examine that dynamic. 
Using the sociologists' framework can help to establish the 
basis for discussion of board/superintendent relations in 
the process of governing American education. 
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Historical Context of Board/Superintendent Relations 
As our examination of role and role theory has shown 
us, an individual's position in society is determined, at 
least in part, by others. The roles one plays are socially 
defined as one's friends and acquaintances participate in the 
development of the broad range of social roles, and as those 
roles change with regard to status and impression. Thus, 
the definitions of the roles that a superintendent or a board 
member is to play change as time and public opinion change; 
in fact, there is significant historical documentation of 
this expectation. In the area of school board history, 
significant work has been done by three indivdiuals: Harmon 
L. Zeigler, Harvey J. Tucker, and Raymond E. Callahan. Zeig-
ler and Tucker, working together, sketch out several "phases" 
of school board role within the history of American education. 
Phase lin Zeigler'[ scheme has the control of nineteenth 
century American educat on 1n the hands of the people with 
large urban districts h ving as many as 40 subdistricts. 
"Each (subdistrict) boa d possessed authority to levy taxes 
and to appo1nt adm1n1st at1ve and teaching personnel" (Zeigler, 
Tucker, & Wilson, 1977, p. 555). While there was an overall 
"central board," this board was almost without power or 
impact as all meaningful decisions were made by the subdis-
trict boards. The democratic idea 1 was paramount as socio-
economic status of the boards was roughly congruent with the 
general population of the subdistrict. This, of course, 
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was a result of the fairly compact area covered by the sub-
district itself, and there was little opportunity for direct 
control by an "anomaly" district from across town. Domination 
by a district of a more powerful economic status or ethnic 
make-up was not likely. Personal attention to problems was 
possible as these subdistricts were manageable with regard 
to size and as those citizens within the subdistricts were 
more directly represented by their elected board members. 
In turn, the elected official was more directly responsible 
to the local constituents, sometimes only being located, 
physically and psychologically, a "block away." The system 
was pure "community control" with a lay board giving very 
localized, nearly individualized, attention to public educa-
tion. 
But, as might be guessed, such localized control was not 
altogether without difficu 1 ties. Local control had been 
democratic enough but also shared all the disadvantages that 
come with the fact that the citizenry could put their hands 
more directly on school affairs. While the system, in and 
of itself, was not corrupt, people sometimes are; and, with 
the opportunity to have direct input with their hands on the 
strings of the education "puppet," there were those who used 
the system to persona 1 advantage. "Urban machines, in func-
tioning to integrate millions of immigrants into political 
life, rewarded votes with jobs •••• The currency of political 
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machines was patronage" (Zeigler et al., 1977, p. 555). 
"Boss Tweed" type machinery was common in the cities while 
rural equivalents reigned supreme in the countryside. School 
district affairs were often "tainted" by illicit business 
dealings where building contracts were ''bought" as were jobs 
and textbook sales opportunities. Teachers' academic and 
pedagogic qualifications were of little significance as 
bribes and nepotism were the top qualifiers for future per-
formance. 
A superintendent in one of the Eastern states writes, 
"nearly all the teachers in our schools get their 
positions by political pulL If they secure a place 
and are not backed by political influence, they are 
likely to be turned out.'' (Kinst, 1984, p. 31) 
Thus, in some communities, machine politics was clearly in 
control of school operations as buildings, materials, and 
teachers were selected without regard to students' interests 
or needs. It is this phase of public education that has 
helped to lead to a dim view that "politics" be left out of 
education. School boards may well have deserved the lumps 
attributed to them upon close examination in this era; many, 
though not all, were in reality and figuratively, "caught 
with their fingers in the till." 
Even during Phase 1, there were many cries that educa-
tion begin to divorce itself of politics. As early as 1851, 
the city of Boston had hired a full-time superintendent to 
help isolate the board from "the evils of the political arena" 
and by 1859 19 other cities had followed their lead. 
24 
The trend toward the creation of superintendencies 
was furthered not only by the cries of reformers who 
wanted to divorce boards from partisan politics but also 
by the growing realization that the school board members 
could not keep up with their jobs. (ERIC Brief, 1981) 
The highly politicized governance system of 'Phase 1 had now 
been injected with what would later be called the "profes-
siena 1" position. The impetus for the reform movement had 
begun and the movement would become overt at the turn of the 
century. 
Zeigler pulls no punches in describing what he 
the reasoning behind the reform movement. He feels that the 
movement 
can be accurately described as a Wasp elite response 
to lay control. By fostering major changes in the 
governing structure of education, the movement 
consciously reduced lay responsibility for education. 
It was clearly a class-based movement to shift the 
response of schools from laymen to experts. (Zeigler 
et al., 1977, p. 555) 
Zeigler's Phase 2 had begun and educational professionalism 
was coming to the fore. By the end of the first 20 years 
of the twentieth century the "professionalization" of educa-
tion was in place and, as Zeigler laments, the accompanying 
loss of parental control was the rule. As is easily surmised, 
these basic changes were deep-seated and the roles of boards 
of education and superintendents began an evolutionary 
direction that was different from before. Whereas boards had 
been virtually omnipotent in Phase 1, the "professional" 
superintendent was gathering influence in Phase 2. These 
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developments in the early twentieth century were giving rise 
to the very issues that are the subject of this study as the 
politicizing of the governance system of schools was changing. 
Zeigler lists the major structural modifications of 
Phase 2 as follows: 
1. The centralization of school administration, to be 
accomplished both by the destruction of the author-
ity of community boards and by the merger of sma 11 
districts into large ones. 
2, The substitution of a smaller central board, elected 
at large, for a large ward-based central board. 
3. The election of board members by non-partisan 
ballots. 
4. The separation of board elections from other 
municipal and state elections. (Zeigler et al., 
1977, p. 555) 
There was little doubt that there were those who were giving 
strong consideration to utilizing the then popular "scien-
tific management" techniques as an element of educational 
governance as they de-emphasized the political aspects of the 
endeavor. The professiona 1 superintendent was on the road 
to becoming the "expert" and the nature of the roles of both 
superintendent and members of the board of education were 
changing. Politically, a transfer of power took place with 
the more advantaged taking control. As the composition of 
boards of education shifted with the structural modifications 
identified by Zeigler, role change was evident, both in what 
the "actors" perceived with regard to themselves and with 
regard to what they were perceived as doing by others. Board 
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membership drifted away from being available to "the people" 
as, in 1927, upper class domination of school board membership 
meant that 90% were male, 96% were white, 70% were college 
graduates, 36% earned incomes in excess of $30,000.00, 
66% were from business and the professions, and 85% were 
Protestant" (Zeigler et al., 1977, p. 556). "Success" became 
a prerequisite for board service. 
Phase 2 not only changed the direction of school gov-
ernance in America, it also led to more real role change for 
board members and superintendents, This was truly the 
"professionalization" of schools as superintendents rose to 
a level of dominance in educational decision-making. Phase 2 
board members reflected the social biases of the social 
reformers and adopted the business mentality of the upper 
classes. This was congruent with the scientific management 
philosophy of the day and boards of education began leaving 
governance to the "experts." A new role was defined in public 
education, professional administrator, and colleges rushed to 
graduate persons who had specialized in the area. School 
board/superintendent relations had changed with the changes 
in role. The superintendent was looked to for direction and 
the board was most likely to follow the "professional." 
While real learning in the area of pedagogy may well have made 
the professionals' opinions of more worth by this time, the 
process of governance had been a 1 tered and the result was 
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far-reaching. Staffs increased as the "expert" employed 
more professionals and school superintendents took on a 
greater significance in their respective communities. Board 
members, the other hand, "do not view their role as repre-
senting, or speaking for, 'the public'; rather, they view it 
speaking for the administration to 'the public'" (Zeigler 
et al., 1977, p. 556). The process for recruitment of board 
members changed dramatically as there was no longer a 
partisan politic a 1 constituency. Recruitment came through 
business contacts, and the democratic processes that had 
forged educational governance at its founding were replaced 
with social status and a network of business and professional 
cronyism. Boards, therefore, typically enacted professionally 
recommended policy and with such action, the goal of educa-
t1onal pol1cy dur1ng Phfse was stability with an accompany-
ing tendency to w1thdra from change. The more conservative 
political ph1losophy was at the fore and social change was 
not a high nat1onal pr1 r1ty for those in seats of power. 
Ze1gler descn .. bes Phase 2 as continuing from the 1920 1 s 
to the early 1950 1 s and what were seen as the new national 
demands for social change. The nation balked at a conserva-
tive acceptance of the status quo with regard to civil 
rights and, in 1954, Brown vs. Board of Education shook 
the conservative view at its foundation. Brown was the 
forerunner of a new era in American domestic policy, in 
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American educational philosophy, and in Zeigler's scheme 
for educational governance. Minority populations began 
demanding "their fair share" of America's bounty and, inad-
vertently, were requesting that schools be returned to 
"local control" by the people. As Phase 2 had drawn to a 
close 
two irreconcilable sets of demands were being placed 
upon schools: 1) that they serve as agents of social 
change and 2) that they return the schools to the 
people. To meet the latter was to deny the former • 
• • • In both sets of demands, however, the superinten-
dent was threatened. (Zeigler et al., 1977, p. 556) 
Again, the pattern of authority over America's schools was 
changing as were the attendant roles and relationships between 
boards of education and superintendents. 
Zeigler•s Phase 3 tells of a totally different pattern 
of authority in the realm of school governance. In this era 
the federal government had decided to utilize schools as a 
vehicle for espousing and implementing a national social 
policy. Phase 2 had seen people lose control to a profes-
sional administrator and Phase 3 saw that administrator lose 
control to a non-local governmental entity. There was a 
proliferation of interventions by the federal government 
federally-funded programs were created to re-distribute 
wealth, ameliorate poverty, and guarantee rights to America•s 
minorities. Entitlement programs and court action were the 
order of the day as neither superintendents nor local boards 
of education were able to stem the growing tide of federal 
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intervention. A growing body of educational research and 
studies such as the first Coleman Report led to the identi-
fication of the single most important factor affecting 
student achievement: family {socioeconomic) background of 
the learner and his fellow learners. This, in short and in 
turn, led to federally proposed busing for racial balance 
and the emotional furor that accompanied it. The result of 
the federal intrusion has been simple, the superintendent 
and the local board of education have experienced a loss in 
authority. In fact, so many areas of interest are decided 
at the federal or state level, that the range of issues avail-
able for discussion by the board and the superintendent has 
been greatly diminished. 
The pattern in Zeigler's analysis is clear; as educational 
goals have broadened, basis for control has done likewise. 
In Phase 1 the local community was focusing on locally deter-
mined goals for its children; by Phase 3 the schools are 
somehow being held responsible for a national economic 
policy and its attendant problems and complications. As 
this happened, the national legion of educational profes-
sionals has grown in size and authority yet the schools have 
not yet been able to accomplish the Phase 3 goal of equalized 
economic opportunity (Zeigler maintains that this wi 11 never 
come to pass). The increased centralization of school gov-
ernance that has resulted has drawn away from local control 
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a national emphasis was substituted. Zeigler says that 
we must return to Phase 1 or Phase 2 or go to an "individual 
control" that would come with a voucher system or the like. 
For Zeigler, any other alternative is simply to accept and 
continue the failure of Phase 3 where stated governmental 
goals will never be met. 
While Zeigler • s interpretive analysis is not perfect 
(when reading Zeigler, one gets the feeling that he has a 
point to prove), his historical journey is substantiated by 
Kirst, Callahan, and others. His conclusions, however, are 
not the same as other authors, especially educational his-
torial Raymond Callahan. As Zeigler sees a consistent rise 
of the superintendent's dominance and power, Callahan 
an evolution of a system where the superintendent and the 
board are mediated by "checks and balances" and where the 
citizen still retains a voice in school governance. Turner 
and Zeigler, of course, would take serious issue with such a 
"liberal" view and it is clear that someone must be mistaken 
in what was, and is, reality. 
Analysis of School Board/Superintendent Relations 
Zeigler and his co-author M. Kent Jennings, in the 
book Governing America 1 s Schools, set out to provide sub-
stantiation for what they feel has become of American public 
school governance. Zeigler states with regard to his hope 
for the book that 
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Agreement on dominance by the superintendent may be 
high among scholars, but the bases upon which the con-
clusions are drawn suffer from a lack of systematic 
observation. One of our objectives, therefore, is to 
assess the extent to which school boards are dominated 
by their superintendents and to explore the factors 
which lead to variations. (Zeigler & Jennings, 1974, 
p. 14) 
In this study, Zeigler and Jennings surveyed school board 
members and superintendents in 82 urban and rural school 
districts. "Democratic theory" was the test used to assess 
school governance as board responsiveness to the public's 
desires was measured. The standard of how democratic the 
school governance system is was based on two indicators: 
how partisan were the board elections and how much opposition 
was provided the superintendent by the board. William L. 
Boyd (1976), an educational researcher, challenges Zeigler's 
and Jennings' interpretation of data and maintains that there 
is an 
Interplay of a welter of fa tors that include the degree 
of urbaneness of the district, the district's size, the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of the district's popula-
tion, the socioeconomic status of the district, and 
the nature of the particular issue in question. 
{Boyd, 1976, p. 539) 
Boyd sees Zeigler and Jennings' analysis as too simplistic 
and maintains that there is a "situational theory" of conflict 
between superintendents and boards of education. 
I have proposed that while educators tend to dominate 
local educational policy making, they usually operate 
within significant and generally neglected or under-
estimated constraints imposed by the local community 
and the school board. (Boyd, 1976, p. 53 
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Varying factors that are situationally present then, deter-
mine, in Boyd 1 s analysis, the temporary dominance of the 
actors involved. "Boyd argues that if most of the time the 
superintendents seem to be running the schools, it is because 
they have the consent of the board and the public (ERIC 
Action Brief, 1981). While the classic statement made by 
Zeigler and Jennings, "school boards should govern or be 
abolished," is an indicator of a powerful case resting within 
their analysis, there is also a substantial degree of doubt 
cast by the interpretations offered by other scholars includ-
ing Callahan and Boyd. 
These varying analyses by Zeigler, Callahan, Boyd, Kirst, 
and others focus on a generalized question that is a vital 
part of our own study: in the examination of board/superin-
tendent relations, how is it that each is really "supposed" 
to behave? Just as we have already seen that there are many 
who are offering opinions and analysis of the positions of 
superintendent, there are also those who are offering generic 
models of the responsibilities of boards of education. 
James A. Mecklenberger (1977) feels that there are two views 
about the role of boards of education widely shared by board 
members and superintendents alke. One says that a school 
board should operate like a corporation's board of directors; 
the other says that a school board should operate as a legis-
lative body. The- distinction of the two types of boards is 
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important because it implies corresponding behavior from 
superintendents. These are generally termed "corporate 
boards" and "legislative boards." 
In beginning to look at these models, it is of 
quence that we return to some previously mentioned under-
standings and terminology. Role theory can be of assistance 
we examine how boards behave. 
Better than any alternative concept in social science, 
the notion of role yields a model of the legislator 
as an acting human individual which is consistent 
with the basic understandings of individual and group 
psychology. • • • Role, for any individual legislator, 
refers to a coherent set of "norms" of behavior which 
are thought by those involved in the interactions being 
viewed, to apply to all persons who occupy the position 
of legislator. (Wahlke, 1962, p. 61) 
Mecklenberger sees a clear delineation between the legisla-
tive role and the corporate role and offers that 
a school board that operates in the manner of a legis-
lative body behaves more aggressively than its corporate 
model counterpart--it creates policy through open debate, 
watches vigorously the progress of its policies, and 
each of its members regards himself as a representative 
or "ombudsman" for a constituency. (Mecklenberger, 
1977, p. 39) 
The general role of the corporate board is viewed differently 
with that board setting only general goals, holding periodic 
reviews of the status of goal achievement, and working as a 
team to provide institutional support. Much to Mecklen-
berger's lament, he states that in the 1970's at a National 
School Boards Association convention, just under 50% of the 
members felt that they should function as a corporate board 
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rather than a legislative one and a full two-thirds of the 
superintendents felt the same way. 
But now, that model may well be changing. A majority 
of the school board members and a full third of the 
superintendents interviewed no longer value the model 
of the corporation type board in public education. 
Instead, they see the school board members • task akin 
to that of a legislator. (Mecklenberger, 1977, p. 39) 
Another parallel exists in a model that has received 
considerable treatment in the literature. This model is 
termed the "harmony model 11 and in many ways parallels the cor-
porate model discussed earlier. The harmony model is, as 
Schmidt and Voss (1976) put it, "based upon the conventional 
wisdom and reformist rhetoric common to writings in political 
science and public administration of nearly 50 years ago" 
(p. 517) • The mode 1 suggests that while the board has the 
policy-making prerogative, the origination and preparation of 
policy should come from the superintendent and his/her staff. 
The only major responsibility granted the board in the model 
is the selection of the superintendent. The superintendent 
is to be sure that the board retains its "proper place" and 
its members are continuously reminded that there is great 
danger in "meddling" in administrative matters. Many writers 
in the area of administrative theory encourage superinten-
dents to "properly educate" their boards and to advise board 
members to see that the schools are properly administered 
but not to administer them. Some authors such as Archie R. 
Dykes actually encourage changes in the legal authority 
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granted boards and superintendents, lessening the former 
and increasing the latter. School board manuals throughout 
the country encourage the essentially passive harmony model 
advocating total acquiescence rather than any hint of con-
flict. The policy vs. administration governance dichotomy 
grew out of this phenomenon. 
Many authors chronicle what they see as superintendents' 
purposeful attempts to increase their own authority while 
decreasing that of the board. Focused complexity is seen as 
a way to confound board members leaving them dependent on 
the "experts." Board agendas are controlled by the super-
intendent as are the suggestions for long and laborious policy 
analysis tasks that can be used to tie the boards • hands 
and keep them occupied and out of the everyday affairs of 
the schools. Treating the board as a "whole" can also be a 
way of avoiding "educating" individual board members and, 
behind all of the above behaviors, is the stringent suggestion 
that the board never appear at odds with the superintendent, 
hence the "harmony model" terminology, Even more controlling 
is the suggestion that all members of the board agree with 
one another and that this, somehow, is some sort of "moral 
obligation." Disapproval of split votes and any other sign 
of factionalism is to be avoided and seen as damaging. Said 
simply, such moral obligation would render the superintendent 
"in control" in all situations outside meetings of the board 
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and in most situations within those meetings. The harmony 
model is clear on its primary assumption "that board effec-
tiveness can only be achieved as a result of board harmony 
and that conflict cannot be equated with effectiveness" 
(Schmidt & Voss, 1976, p. 522), Writers such as Donald R. 
Magruder (1984) encourage such harmony as he advises readers 
that the best school systems are characterized by boards 
and superintendents who "work well" together. While there 
is little doubt that this credo is true, we might be quick to 
point out that in its typical usage this means no conflict 
rather than a rational exchange of differing opinions fol-
lowed by a real effort to seek resolution. Magruder's admis-
sian that "rt•·s easy to see how policy problems arise between 
superintendents and school boards; sometimes it's difficult 
to tell the difference between making and regulating school 
policy" (p. 18) is simply a restatement of the age old policy 
vs. administration paradox and his suggestion for resolving 
it is that the superintendent simply decides. 
Verna M. Fletcher (1980) has also identified this same 
policy vs. administration dichotomy and her comments are 
revealing as to the effects it has on school board/super-
intendent relations: 
the power struggle over: who controls schools has created 
a disillusioned public, a frustrated group of citizens 
called board members, and job-hopping educators called 
superintendents. The dissillusioned public is question-
ing how well we are educating today' s children. Board 
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members are caught between the angry public's cries 
for a responsive educational system and educators who 
firmly state: "Keep out of administration. We experts 
know what is best! 11 (Fletcher, 1980, p. 2) 
This dichotomy is parallel to the previously mentioned ways 
of expressing this source of conflict in the governance of 
America's public schools. The "phases" of development as 
described by Zeigler, the high degree of board involvement 
in administrative matters during the early years and the 
decline later on as chronicled by Fletcher, and the corporate 
vs. legislative board conflict described by Mecklenberger 
are all indicators of a need to speak to the relationship 
between boards and superintendents. Resolution of and/or 
coping with the fact of the dichotomy wi 11 be a measure of 
the success in school governance. 
The quintessential disagreement, at present, over board 
and superintendent roles can be found between two individuals 
who have vastly differing perspectives. One is a past presi-
dent of the American School Boards Association, Winfield Smih, 
and the other is the Executive Director of the American 
Association of School Administrators, Paul Salmon. These 
two individuals demonstrate the real variance of opinion with 
regard to proper role differentiation between superintendents 
and boards of education. Winfield Smith is a proponent of 
Harmon Zeigler and begins his comments by stating, "Superin-
tendents run schools but school boards should" (1982, p. 27). 
He laments what he sees as a rise in technical judgments and 
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their taking precedence over political responsiveness. He 
observes that superintendents now initiate policy which is 
clearly board of education responsibility and that, begin-
ning with curriculum and instruction, they have expanded to 
control budget preparation, fiscal matters, purchasing, site 
selection, and all other areas of school operations. The 
superintendent has come to be in charge of everything, com-
munication and data processing equipment, public relations 
avenues and the like and, therefore, board members feel 
inadequate in the face of such advantageous resources. 
Result: Board members see and discuss only what the 
superintendent leads them to deal with. The superin-
tendent can act on his own. The board, a multimember 
body, must reach consensus to act •.•• Individual 
board members must be less decisive than the super-
intendent, so the superintendent can more readily attain 
the support of a majority of the board. (Smith, 1982, 
p. 28) 
The superintendent, then, gets to come across as the single 
expert and board members are advised that they need to 
support his/her program or to fire him/her. Smith asserts 
that the board's responsibility to the people is far stronger 
than what he might call the technical opinion of a profes-
sional vagabond. He lists the "myths" that he says cloud 
our thinking with regard to school governance. They are: 
--Educational decisions are technical and should be 
left to the superintendent. 
--The board should be a buffer between the community 
and the superintendent. 
--Teachers should never meet directly with the board 
of education. 
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Smith feels that boards have become more remote from the 
people and that they lllJS t return to the ascendancy of demo-
era tic theory over technical decision-making. 
Paul Salmon, echoing Boyd's "situational theory," 
responds to the comments of Winfield Smith by saying that 
the whole issue is a situational one, that there is great 
variance from school system to school system and from time to 
time. Salmon warns that relying too heavily on personal 
experience is dangerous and touts that he has gone further 
and has done genuine research on the issue. He challenges 
Smith's use of the term "run" in describing what boards 
should do in schools and substitutes the term "govern. 11 
Smith maintains that the dominant person in the board member/ 
superintendent relationship varies with a wide range of cir-
cumstances. For 1nstan~e, "when the school board and the 
superintendent accurate y reflect the values and expectations 
of the community, the s per1ntendent is often dominant" 
(Smith, 1982, p. 30). However, "if the superintendent begins 
to vary from the community's values and expectations, 
research indicates that controversy will arise and the board 
will become dominant" (Smith, 1982, p. 30). As would seem 
obvious, superintendents would be dominant in internal issues 
with boards often stepping to the fore when external forces 
are brought to bear. Salmon utilizes the research of Donald 
J. McCarty and Charles E. Ramsey and identifies four gen-
eralized "types" of boards of education with a disclaimer 
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that has all boards acting out all four "types" at varying 
times. The "power-structure-oriented board" is most influ-
enced by members of the loca 1 power structure. This narrow 
base of power is very restrictive and a superintendent 
serving such a board will be a servant of that board. This 
can become very comfortable if the superintendent's values 
closely approximate that of the power structure. The "fac-
tionated board" has strong and conflicting factions among 
its members and a superintendent who serves this board must 
be very politically astute. Four/three votes will be the 
rule and the superintendent must manage to feel secure in a 
one vote win. Mediation becomes an important skill as posi-
tive action is pursued. "Status-congruent boards" are 
internally motivated to make their district a better district. 
Constituencies are considered as they attempt to arrive at 
the synthesis of community opinion that can result in a 
better education for students. This district's superinten-
dent has a chance to become an "educational leader." Lastly, 
there is the "sanctioning board." The board "trusts" the 
superintendent as the "best" and feels comfortable inter-
preting the superintendent to the community. 
While Salmon describes all four boards as being properly 
applicable to specific situations that arise, he does admit 
that change is evident in general; that sanctioning boards 
are disappearing and that factionated boards are on the 
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increase. Although Salmon proposes that theory, he does 
not provide empirical analysis to determine if these types 
actually exist. However, unlike Smith, who says that "school 
board authority remains available ... it awaits only board 
members bold enough to grasp it" (Smith, 1982, p. 28), 
Salmon holds that "boards and superintendents can work 
together with mutual respect to improve public schools for 
everyone" (Smith, 1982, p. 30). Though neither has provided 
direct tests of their theories, Smith's position certainly 
sounds more extreme while Sa lrron 's sounds menacingly innoc-
uous. We suspect that both lack the capacity to explain a 11 
cases. 
With historical role development and a discussion of the 
sociological aspects of role theory already covered in our 
study, we want to look at more recent ideas centered 
board/superintendent relations. While the dichotomy out-
lined by Smith and Salmon is generally applicable, others 
have studied the role conflict phenomenon, many trying to 
resolve it. Two authors, Carl Hoover and Jim Slezak, have 
readily admitted that "it's too simple to say the board sets 
the policy and the superintendent implements it" (Slezak & 
Hoover, 1978, p. 38), and have described what the Mt. Diablo 
Unified School District in northern California has done 
to define respective responsibilities. The district has 
created what they call a Decision Analysis Chart that lists 
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approximately 100 decision situations. These situations are 
categorized into five 11 distinct 11 levels ranging from the 
superintendent having complete authority to the superinten-
dent being totally excluded with inverse levels of authority 
avai !able for the board of education in each case. The 
chart is re-created when the board members or the superinten-
dent changes and the system, so says its authors, helps to 
build board/superintendent consensus by giving proper consid-
eration to resolution of conflict before the emotion of the 
actual conflict arises. While there is virtual certainty 
that the 100 situations listed are not always sufficient, 
the intent behind the model makes sense, that is, to make 
board/superintendent relations more harmonious. No evidence 
is offered, however, to substantiate that "more harmonious" 
is "more effective." 
Mt. Diablo is not the only district to have attempted to 
simplify role/relationship behavior through a system of 
situations arrived at by board/superintendent consensus. 
Don E. Halverson describes a role/relationship grid created 
by the San Mateo County Office of Education that is astonish-
ingly similar to that developed by Mt. Diablo. The same five 
level range is utilized and the attendant problems surround-
ing blurred lines of authority for unlisted situations are 
present. 
Although no one seems particularly able to make the 
board/superintendent relationship one that is easily managed, 
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there are several authors who are quick to point up what can 
exacerbate negative feeling. Carolyn Mullins (1974) discusses 
a national survey of superintendents and augments this data 
with superintendent interviews. The overall result is 
clearly one that is heartfelt by those surveyed and reveals 
the superintendent as 
a man who is not always blameless himself, but none-
theless often takes the blame for developments over 
which he has little control. •.• A man who could 
use more understanding, if not support, from his board 
than he seems to be getting. (Mullins, 1974, p. 17) 
She also intimates the opinions of superintendents that 
most board members are not profoundly well-intentioned and, 
in fact, many have selfish, self-centered motivations. In 
view of what has been said earlier, such feeling from super-
intendents should not be surprising. Stating the same 
intentions for board/superintendent relations in a more posi-
tive fashion, Ben Brodinsky says that the following behaviors 
can create a "win-win" situation for the board members and 
superintendents. "Each protects the image of the other, no 
one puts down or disparages another, no one claims that what 
he wants is the greatest, the best, the only and everyone 
listens" (Brodinsky, 1983, p. 5). In the same vein, Dorothy 
Kearns, a North Carolina school board member, advocates "a pos-
itive posture of give and take and mutual trust" (Kearns, 
1982, p. 25) between superintendents and boards of education 
couching her ideas in terms that are approachable and 
resolution-oriented. 
Other research speaks to how board members and super-
intendents view themselves and their working cohorts. 
Although so much of what we have seen suggests that there 
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are irreconcilable differences between boards and superinten-
dents, Gordon Cawelti, the Executive Director of the Associa-
tion of Supervision and curriculum Development, surveyed urban 
superintendents in all American cities of more than 300,000 
population and sampled those cities between 100,000 and 300,000 
population and found a surprisingly positive bent. In a 
"report card" for their boards created by the superintendent, 
26% received "A's," 53% received "B's," 15% netted "C's," 
6% earned "D's," and no board was given a failing grade. 
While there were negatives identified, this avera 11 result 
was pleasantly positive and the prediction for the future was 
upbeat. Cawelti makes mention of a very important factor 
that could explain the more positive result in this study, 
that "big city" superintendents see a need for the role of 
the superintendent to change to accommodate boards that are 
becoming more involved in administrative and management 
matters. These superintendents were aware that leadership 
style is a crucial factor and that a need for a more "polit-
ical" stance is arising. Although Cawelti's research results 
are surprising, his recommendations are not. He suggests 
that superintendents "make a greater effort to orient new board 
members; insure good planning and leadership for board 
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meetings, encourage community leaders to run for the board 
and jointly develop a decision matrix board/ superintendent 
roles" (Cawelti, 1982, p. 35). 
A state-specific study of the perceptions of members of 
boards of education was done in the state of Texas. In this 
study board members were asked both how they feel about 
their own role and that of the superintendent. When respond-
ing to questions regarding what their own role should be, 
a very broad range of answers were evident. 
Only 6 percent thought their primary responsibility 
was to formulate policy. Forty percent felt that 
the board should be concerned primarily with finance. 
One board member even states that he does not know 
what the primary responsibility of the board is. 
(Studies in Education, 1970, p. 11) 
When asked about the role of the superintendent "the author 
felt that the typical board member could not verbalize the 
role of the superJ.ntendtnt and would generally state that l. t 
is to 'run the schools'" ( (p. 15). One interesting tendency 
did result, that board members tend to feel that the super-
intendent is responsible for suggesting policy change to 
the board rather than the opposite. This, of course, flies 
full in the face of the typical dichotomy of policy vs. 
administration discussed earlier in this study and demon-
strates the complexity of the whole issue of board/super-
intendent roles and relations. 
Another Texas study done by Mark Littleton. and Lynn 
Turner revealed widespread disagreement over the role of 
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superintendents. The researchers surveyed 251 board members 
to gather a broad range of responses as they attempted to 
illuminate the board/superintendent relationship. Like in 
nearly all other studies, Littleton and Turner found "a general 
lack of understanding of each other's role is the major stumb-
ling block to effective board/administrator relationships that 
affect the entire educational process of the schools" 
(Littleton & Turner, 1984, p. 32). They also note that the 
superintendent is dominant and that superintendents feel that 
this is true. The major result of the study is simply that 
board members are not in agreement with regard to what the 
superintendent should be and do and this, in turn, makes it 
very difficult for the superintendent to arrive at a set of 
behaviors that will satisfy the total board membership. Like-
wise, a Georgia study done by Sidney E. Brown mirrors somewhat 
the same attitude but focuses on the board president (chairman) 
role. Brown says that 
an association exists between the job satisfaction of 
Georgia school superintendents and the leader behavior 
of the school board president. Apparently superin-
tendents will have higher job satisfaction when they 
have an opportunity to work with board presidents who 
exhibit a high degree of supportive behavior and who 
display concern for achievement of the organizational 
objectives. (Brown, 1978, p. 68) 
Politicization: The Present Reality 
To this point, we have taken an extensive look at how 
roles of board members and superintendents are defined by a 
broad range of people: board members themselves, 
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superintendents, and citizens at large. we have examined 
how scholars in the field see the roles in question and how 
they feel that boards and superintendents can manage to work 
together effectively, yet there has been less than sufficient 
treatment of an overall construct that is important as an 
organizing framework for our analysis. Two major questions 
seem to arise from this broad examination of the literature 
on board/superintendent roles and relationships and they are, 
simply, just how politicized is the system of governance of 
America's public schools and how politicized should it be? 
We intimated, in Chapter I, that we feel that public educa-
tion is, whether we like it or not, a profoundly political 
activity. The fact is that the effort cannot transcend the 
political, it is by definition, political because it is 
"public. 11 The idea of public education was forged in a 
political process to perform as a political process; and 
although the endeavor may have drifted away from this at 
times {Zeigler's Phase 1), as long as it stays politicized 
the people can "bring it back" to where they can feel most 
comfortable. To be directly opposed to at least a mildly 
politicized process of decision-making in public education 
is somewhat akin to doubting the founding fathers: difficult 
without considerable rationalizing. There is, therefore, 
little need to deny that school business is political busi-
ness; it was political even in the days of "professionalization" 
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in the 1960's. There is also little need to deny that it is 
becoming more political, whether or not one can agree that we 
are "returning" to something or "progressing" to something. 
A group of Canadian researchers surveyed all of the CEO's 
(chief executive officers, i.e., superintendents) in Canada 
and "the vast majority of CEO's (82%) agreed that they work 
in a political environment and that their setting is becoming 
political each year" (Isherwood, Falconer, Lavery, 
McConaghy, _&! Clotz, 1977_, p. 17). There are many school 
superintendents who have not yet come to this realization or, 
worse yet, are still trying to hold back a public and a board 
of education that is acting politically. The tide cannot be 
stemmed and it is simply going to be up to superintendents 
to create and to utilize their own political savvy. The 
evidence is more than clear; Zeigler's "phases," Mecklen-
berger 1 s corporate vs. legislative board paradox, and nearly 
all the areas suspect of causing board/superintendent conflict 
can be said to be, in varying ways, a question of admitting 
the politicization of public school governance. '!'he new 
role of the superintendent can be, in many ways, more exciting 
than the old, releasing the creative tensions on behalf 
of children. In this fashion, the superintendent becomes 
responsible for the efficient and effective functioning of 
the board 1 s 11 political system 11 as he/she helps to shape edu-
cational policy. 
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Edward Banfield, in a book entitled Political Influence: 
A New Theory of Urban Politics, has defined politics as acts 
of influence and a political environment would be one in 
which individuals and groups seek to influence each other in 
a series of issues over a period of time. Using his term-
inology, there are key individuals and groups in the board 
of education's "environment." Internal "influencers 11 would 
be board members, superintendents, principals, teachers, and 
the like. External "influencers" would include parents and 
other community members. Special interest groups, the media, 
and others would also be external "influencers." The new 
superintendent must be able to wield influence and manage 
decision-making through political strategies designed specif-
ically for the appropriate individuals or groups. To do less 
is to leave the real power to others and the superintendent 
who believes that his/her opinion is of consequence must, 
both ethically and professionally, be sure that the opinion 
is heard, accepted, and implemented. The board of education/ 
superintendent environment is politicized and requires polit-
ical expertise if children are to be effectively served. 
As we have examined board of education/superintendent 
relations through a survey of the attendant literature, we 
can summarize the generalities that emerge. They are as 
follows: 
- The terms "board of education member'1 and "superin-
tendent" designate roles and these roles follow the 
basic patterns for analysis set forth in what is 
called "role theory." 
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- School governance occurs within a political environ-
ment and has been through periods of greater and 
lesser overt politicization. 
- There has been, and continues to be, great uncer-
tainty with regard to what are the proper roles for 
both members of boards of education and public school 
superintendents both between those in the roles and 
those outside those roles. 
These generalities are important as we enter our own analysis 
of board/superintendent relations. As mentioned earlier, we 
will be looking at these fragile relationships as they are 
focused in one area, public school finance. While the 
literature seldom speaks directly to this area, there is one 
factor that continuously emerged as important when finance 
was mentioned. Fiscal matters represent an area where board 
members tend to feel most responsible. In a previously cited 
study, research done in Texas revealed that 40% of the board 
members of that state felt that their primary function was 
to deal with the financial matters in their district. More-
over, all of the role identification schemes for boards 
discussed earlier cite the area of finance as one where 
board members see their responsibility as a "key" respon-
sibility. Recognizing school finance as important, Halverson 
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created his role/relationship grid for the San Mateo School 
District and included financial elements. 
School districts accomplish the gathering of revenues 
through taxation, bond issues, and other public avenues. Each 
of these revenue sources is a result of citizen action and 
there is little surprise in the fact that board members have 
great interest in these areas. The public is always most 
protective of its purse and the public is, of course, 
the board • s constituency. Tax revel ts are now legendary 
and the popular view is that the public will vote out of 
office anyone favoring tax increases. When issues of finance 
are evident, in many ways, the board • s future is at stake. 
The public may well not understand the jargoned nuances of 
the educational endeavor but it is a sure thing that they 
understand the meaning of "tax increase" or "bond issue." It 
goes nearly without saying, then, that finance looms signif-
icant in the eyes of board members. One purpose of our study 
is to offer a greater degree of systematic analysis to the 
area of school finance as it affects school board/superin-
tendent relations. 
A New Perspective 
There is one more area of interest in the literature 
with regard to the way boards of education and superintendents 
operate. James H. Svara, a professor of political science, 
has reconceptualized the relationship between policy and 
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administration, uti 1 izing the city counci 1 /city manager as 
the example. Svara makes mention of the well-worn policy/ 
administration dichotomy as having been identified by Woodrow 
Wilson in the larger political arena but this dichotomy is, 
for our own purposes, the same that is infamous in the lit-
erature on board of education/superintendent relations. The 
dichotomy model has met several challenges and it has per-
severed for what Svara believes to be two reasons. 
First, it is partially accurate in describing the 
relationship between elected officials and adminis-
trators. Second, the model provides a normative base, 
rooted in democratic theory, for assessing the appro-
priateness of behavior. (Svara, 1985, p. 221) 
In his research, Svara interviewed both elected and 
administrative officials and citizen leaders in five North 
Carolina cities with populations over 100,000. In attempting 
to descibe both city council and administrative roles, the 
participants presumed a dichotomy of functions. 
A majority perceived separation and asserted its value 
to the operation of the system, yet they frequently 
referred to instances that deviated from that division, 
and 41% of the respondents indicated that there was 
some form of "mixture", either staff in policy or coun-
cilors in administration. (Svara, 1985, p. 221) 
This "fence sitting" was to lead Svara to suggest another 
model of behavior that he would call the "dichotomy-duality 
model." 
Before detailing his own model, Svara describes other 
generalized models that have historically been offered. The 
first, of course, is the "Policy-Administration Dichotomy Model" 
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that is at the heart of the issue (see Figure 1). This 
model simply purports that the two functions are separate, 
and by implication assumes that they can be kept so. The 
second model is called the "Mixture in Policy Model" (see 
Figure 1). This model, in short, accepts the fact that there 
may be some sharing of responsibilities in policy areas where 
both administrators and elected officials will, from time 
to time, make decisions. Model number three is termed the 
"Mixture in Administration Model" and is the antithesis of 
the previously mentioned model (see Figure 1). This model 
chronicles recent tendencies for legislative prerogatives to 
overcome barriers to administrative action. The final model 
is the "Elected Official-Administrator As Co-Equals in Policy 
Model 11 {see Figure 1) and "asserts the ethical obligation of 
administrators to promote values of equity and participation 
and to oppose actions by elected officials which would be 
adverse to the interests of the politically powerless" 
(Svara, 1985, p. 224). This, of course, is a break from 
democratic theory and demonstrates administrative intrusion 
into policy but no intrusion into administration by elected 
officials. 
Based upon our review of literature, in the field of 
education, we can conclude that the policy vs. administration 
dichotomy appears clean and neat but simply does not mirror 
reality. The reality is that policy and administration are 
intertwined and the various models described above offer 
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1a. 1b, 
POLICY-ADMINISTRATION 
DICHOTOMY MIXTURE IN POLICY 
Figure 1. 
Source: 
1 ,, 1d. 
ELECTED OFFICIAL-ADMINISTRATOR 
AS CO-EQUALS IN POLICY 
Existing models of relationship between elected 
officials and administrators in governmental process. 
Public Administration Review, January/February 1985, 
p. 223. 
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several versions of that melding. Svara discovers the same 
phenomena and concludes that none of the models he reviewed 
are sufficient to describe what he sees as the real world. 
He suggests that 
the concepts "policy" and "administration" are each 
broken down into two component functions, and data are 
presented to show how councilors and managers are both 
involved in some functions and largely excluded from 
others. The new model simultaneously accommodates 
division and sharing of responsibilitiy in the govern-
mental process. (p. 222) 
Svara's model has four distinct areas of action. The first 
is "mission" which refers to the organization's philosophy, 
its broadest goals in the broadest terms. This area is 
solely the responsibility of elected officials and totally 
fulfills any requirements of democratic theory. The second 
area is policy but in a more middle-range sense. This, for 
example, would involve decisions on whether to begin a new 
program, redistribute duties, or the like and would involve 
interaction between elected officials and administrators. 
A majority of North Carolina councilors and city managers 
felt that this "shared response" was a fact in their situa-
tions. In the area of budgeting, councils set budget limits 
and performed other control functions while staff accom-
plished the actual budgeting process. The area of policy 
emerges an area of mixed responsibility involving general 
limits set by council and specific policy content set by the 
manager and staff. "Conclusions that stress either council 
or staff dominance or exclusion are not supportable in these 
cities" (Svara, 1985, p. 226). 
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Administration is the third area and it "refers to the 
specific decisions, regulations, and practices employed to 
achieve policy objectives" (Svara, 1985, p. 226). Svara 
cites administration largely as the domain of bureaucracy but 
also identifies four legislative aspects of the area: 
specification of techniques to be employed, implementing 
decisions, intervention in delivery, and legislative over-
sight. There are, therefore, strong policy implications in 
administration and elected officials; in this case councilors 
and in our case board members are involved. 
Management is the last area and refers to action taken 
to support both policy and administrative functions. Specific 
methods and techniques of managers are the stuff of this 
area. While councilors do get involved on occasion in changes 
in management areas such as staff reorganizations, grievance 
procedures, etc., for the most part boundaries between elected 
officials and administrators tend to be clear. 
In Svara' s model, each of the four functions blends into 
the next to form a continuum from "pure policy" to "pure 
management" (see Figure 2). However, the problems that have 
accompanied what has been the two pole dichotomy that has 
existed in the past have been moderated by a more realistic 
evolution by degree from one pole to the other. The mission/ 
policy end of the continuum is more heavily dominated by the 
elected official while the management/administration end is 
ILLUSTRATIVE TASKS 
FOR COUNCIL 
Determine ··purpose.·· scope ol serv1ces. 
tax level. constlluhonal issues 
Pass ordinances. approve new prOjects 
and programs. ratify budget 
Make implementing dec1s1ons. e.g .. s1te 
selection. handle complaints. oversee 
adm1nistrat1on 
Suggest management changes to 
manager: review organizational perlor-
mance 1n manager"s appra1sat 
DIMENSIONS OF 
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 
MANAGER'S SPHERE 
ILLUSTRATIVE TASKS 
FOR ADMINISTRATORS 
Advise (what city ''can·· do may influence 
what 11 ""should"" do:) analyze conditions 
and trends 
Make recommendations on an decrsions. 
fomrulate budget. determ1ne serv1ce 
.dls!nbut1on formulae 
Establish practrces and procedures and 
make decisions lor Implementing policy 
Control the human. material and informa-
tiOnal resources of organization to sup-
port policy and adminrstrat1ve functions 
The curved line suggests the division between the Council's and the Manager's 
spheres of actiVity. with the Council to the left and !he manager to the nght of the line 
The diVIsion presented is intended to roughly approximate a ""proper"' degree of 
~ne~:r~~~~~ and shanng Shilts to e1ther the !ell or right would md1cate 1mproper 
Figure 2. Mission-management separation with shared responsibility 
for policy and the administration. 
Source: Public Administration Review, January/February 1985, 
p. 228. 
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equally dominated by the administrator. Towards the point 
where the two inward pointing vectors meet, the dichotomy 
becomes less a dichotomy and more a situation where shared 
responsibility is the rule; they become, in effect, what 
Svara terms a "duality." Svara does not present the model 
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as a way to dea 1 with a 11 of the uncertainties of the 
relationships; rather, he says that "the size of the spheres 
(of influence) is not based on absolute values at this stage 
in the development of the model, but it is intended to be 
suggestive of the tendencies in council/manager relations" 
(p. 228). He then extracts four generalized "types" that he 
says can be abstracted by the research in North Carolina 
cities. The "types" are "strong manager," "council-dominant," 
"council incursion," and "council manager standoff" (see 
Figure 3). Svara also suggests that further research could 
more precisely delineate the division of each function in 
the council-manager form of government. 
William P. Browne at Central Michigan University has done 
further study testing Svara 1 s model. Browne was concerned 
with Svara 1 s results because of what he felt was a limited 
data base and, possibly, a set of varying geographic and 
contextual circumstances. Browne utilized data gathered in 
the state of Michigan in testing Svara 1 s model. As a result 
of his research, Browne offered two important conclusions: 
first, that there may very well be regional differences in 
3a. 
STRONG MANAGER 
• 
• • • • 
: MANAGEMENT 
• • 
MANAGER'S SPHERE 
3c. 
COUNCIL INCURSION 
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3b. 
COUNCIL DOMINANT 
3d. 
COUNCIL-MANAGER 
STANDOFF 
Figure 3. Deviations from typical division. 
Source: Public Administration Review, January/February 1985, 
p. 229. 
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reactions by both elected officials and administrators. 
Second, and more importantly, he concluded that "the svara 
model provides the best available framework for such analysis; 
its availability should awaken what has become a dormant, 
a 1 though sti 11 inadequately understood, resear-ch area" (Browne, 
1985, p. 621). Browne•s findings further enhance the utility 
of the Svara model and its potential to explain relationships 
between elected officials and appointed administrators. 
Svara suggests that his model identifies a condition 
that gives credence to a system of city government that is not 
necessarily dichotomous and conflict-bound. The importance 
of the model lies in the fact that effective interaction can 
take place in an environment that effectively balances dis-
cretion and control. The model discredits the complete 
separation of policy and administration that has already been 
discredited by actua 1 practice, while at the same time 
avoiding the trap of developing a model that would suggest 
some sort of magical and unrealistic intermingling of the 
two areas. The key is joint concern, and therefore joint 
action in encouraging a full contribution from both adminis-
trative staff and elected officials. While the model is 
focused on city council members and city managers, it is 
obvious that there may be important parallels for members of 
boards of education and public school superintendents. Our 
research will provide further insight into that possibility. 
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Harmon Zeigler, Ellen Kehoe, and Jane Reisman have 
recently published a work that is helpful as we look at school 
board/superintendent relations. They compare city managers, 
who were the topic of svara' s model, and public school super-
intendents, and the study is of special importance as it pro-
vi des an added dimension to Svara 's work as we 11 as being 
particularly illuminating as to how superintendents operate. 
The authors are particularly pleased to be able to provide 
a comparative study, "a comparison that may appear odd, 
especially to educationists accustomed to years of political 
and institutional isolation" (Zeigler, Kehoe, & Reisman, 
1985, p. xiii). In their comparison of superintendents and 
city managers a stratified probability sample of Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas in and around two major metro-
politan areas--San Francisco and Chicago--was used. In each 
area both superintendents and city managers were interviewed 
and surveyed. 
The city managers' lot is seen by nearly everyone as 
profoundly political and, unlike the cries that emanate from 
educational circles, there is little denial of this fact 
among managers. Zeigler, likewise, is a proponent of viewing 
the governance of public schools as a political process. 
The researchers begin by stating that "although their differ-
ences are substantial, superintendents and city managers have 
one essential characteristic in common: They are profes-
sionally trained experts held accountable to lay legislatures" 
62 
(Zeigler et al., 1985, p. 1), hence Zeigler's comment that 
both tasks are political in nature. The authors identify 
the greatest differences between superintendents and city 
managers is in the area of dealing with conflict. They see 
the differences being based on the following characteristics 
of the two endeavors: 
1. Superintendents' stronger sense of professional 
identification is a disadvantage in handling expanded 
conflicts, where expertise is not as relevant a 
resource as in intraorganizational disputes. 
2. The difference in the scope and nature of the 
"public goods" superintendents and city managers 
administer implies that the two groups wil 1 need 
different skills to deal with conflict. The mix 
of technical and ideological conflict is charac-
teristically different for each group, and so the 
most effective mix of skills will also vary. 
3. Managers and superintendents have different roles 
as policy initiators, and have different relation-
ships with their elected councils/boards. Conflict 
management styles will vary according to the parties 
to the conflict. 
4. Municipa 1 government is functionally decentralized, 
and the school system is geographically decentra-
lized. Consequently, managers and superintendents 
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confront different kinds of alliances between 
subordinates and clientele groups. Heads of munici-
pal departments develop strong relations with 
functional interest groups, and principals develop 
geographic bases of influence. 
Conflict resolution is a major focus of the Zeigler study, 
and he and his fellow authors feel that many superintendents 
view this "natural" phenomenon in an unrealistic fashion. 
The study, like others, points up the differences between 
resolution based on technical knowledge and that coming out 
of an abi 1 i ty to manage politic a 1 factors and situations. 
Implicit in the authors' findings is the assumption that 
avoidance of political vehicles for resolution is actually 
the avoidance of conflict which, in their view, is totally 
unrealistic. These authors feel that "not only is conflict 
normal, it is, according to the political view, healthy 
rather than pathological" (Zeigler et al., 1985, p. 19). 
An additional differentiating factor is identified when the 
authors point out the fact that many superintendents subscribe 
to the idea that conflict can be dealt with in a "win-win" 
manner, They maintain that the tradi tiona 1 politic a 1 phi los-
ophy of "win-lose" more closely approximates reality. Brodin-
sky's view of board/superintendent relations closely parallels 
this "win-win" philosophy, and Zeigler maintains that such a 
view hampers superintendents' abilitiy to get on with the 
business of education as his/her constituents prescribe it, 
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As stated before, Zeigler and his co-authors utilized a 
comparative method to attempt to shed light on the specified 
administrative roles. Several things emerge from the data 
collected. Superintendents, sometimes spoken of as being 
"beleaguered" and attacked from all sides, are not as 
"beleaguered" as often thought. A comparison with city 
managers reveals that superintendents, in fact, spend less 
time managing conflict with their legislative bodies than 
city managers. Likewise, lower levels of conflict with the 
members of the public are recorded by the superintendents. 
While the enormously emotional task of dealing with citizens' 
children can help to explain some of the differential, it 
does sti 11 seem that superintendents no worse off than 
city managers. In addition, superintendents were identified 
as being less willing to enter into opposition of their legis-
lative bodies and the public, an indicator of the aforemen-
tioned conflict avoidance rather than conflict resolution 
(i.e., the "harmony model"). Interestingly, and parallel 
to our previous comments on the work of Erving Goffman regard-
ing "presentation of self," mention is made of Kenneth 
Duckworth's comments at a 1981 conference regarding "heroes" 
vs. "heralds." Duckworth's definition of "hero" summons up 
a vision of a mythical figure endowed with superhuman strength 
and power and it is this definition that might encourage 
educators to enter the area of public school administration. 
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As behaviors reminiscent of the "harmony model" lessen and 
political pressures increase, the probability that the super-
intendent can be a "hero" diminishes. The "herald" is "an 
official at a tournament of arms with duties including making 
announcements and the marshalling of the combatants" (Zeigler 
et al., 1985, p. 159), and it is this role that the present 
day superintendent is most likely to play. While the data do 
not support the fact that superintendents are any more "put 
upon" than city managers or other such officials, the 
expectation of being a "hero" might well explain the claim 
of "beleaguerment." 
In the final analysis Zeigler, Kehoe, and Reisman have 
concluded that, like it OL not, superintendents are involved 
in an increasingly political arena. Their advice for super-
intendents is the same as it would be for city managers: 
if you want to win, you must learn and be willing to play 
the political game. 
Summary 
There exists a rather substantial body of literature on 
board of education/superintendent relations. Much of this 
literature focuses on the conflict inherent in the inter-
relationship between the two and, unfortunately, does not 
offer solutions for achieving a conflict-free vehicle for 
problem resolution, rather asking that educators become more 
comfortable with the reality of conflict. Many authors 
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provide techniques, such as decision-making grids and the 
like, for reducing conflict; however, none are able to accom-
plish a conflict-free environment. While conflict resolution 
techniques may reduce the tension that exists between the 
two sets of actors, some conflict will remain inevitable. 
The requirements of democratic theory and, thus, the expecta-
tions upon the actors suggest that the resolutions sought 
must be attempted in a political context. The early litera-
ture says that the dichotomy model of interrelationships would 
provide the answer to working in a political world. Exper-
ience amply demonstrates that these models were insufficient. 
Non-dichotomous models such as that provided by Svara are a 
step towards a realistic treatment of the conflict that has 
become a reality in the governance of America's public 
schools. Non-dichotomous models have not been tested in 
education and our research seeks to determine, in part, if 
models outside education are applicable. 
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CHAPTER I I I 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
There is ample evidence, both in the literature and in 
real experience, to document the concern over board of 
education/superintendent relations. The conflict that exists 
grows out of a democratic tradition that asks that "the 
people" have some voice in what is to take place in public 
institutions through representatives chosen by the people 
themselves. This "lay" control element is a source of tension 
as board members voice the public's opinion to professional 
educational administrators. The administrator relies 
base in knowledge and training while the board member is to 
do "the public's will." Although both are very often operat-
ing from a base of good intention, intense emotion and 
conflict usually follow. 
Our research is guided by an understanding, both in the 
literature and in practice, of the democratic tradition that 
is the backdrop for action in public education and the 
reality of conflict reported by the actors involved as well 
as, publicly, by the media. The emotion generated in and 
over schools is apparent and the resulting actions need to 
be, and everyone seems to agree on this point, advantageous 
for America • s young people. 
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As we sought to examine board of education/superinten-
dent relations, we were confronted with the magnitude of the 
possible avenues for conflict. Public education is a complex 
endeavor requiring that many elements be intertwined to 
produce the educational process. To attempt to analyze all 
of these elements and their potential for conflict would 
result in the analysis of a morass of complex interrelation-
ships and would, most likely, yield no real definitive 
result. Rather than to attempt such a risky proposition, 
we have chosen to narrow the focus and concern ourselves 
with board of education/superintendent relationships only 
in the area of school finance. We have chosen school finance 
due to its role as a fa~.:ilitator of much of the activity that 
takes place in public education; without funding, little 
else can become an educational reality. In addition, school 
finance is reported in the literature as important to both 
superintendents and members of boards of education, in fact, 
with research placing it at the top of the public's concern 
(Zeigler, Tucker, & Wilson, 1976). The public's purse never 
fails to engender great interest. We see, then, school 
finance as an area that has a high potential for conflict 
between board members and superintendents. How boards and 
superintendents deal with these potential conflict areas 
should serve as a means of looking at the perceptions that 
exist in how board of education/superintendent relationships 
work. 
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In addition to utilizing public school finance as our 
area of concern in examining board/superintendent rela-
tionships, we chose to confine our study to a single state. 
While our own interest was focused on North Carolina, we also 
wanted to be certain that we were able to ascertain a broad 
perspective within the state, thus we sought the opinions of 
all superintendents in North Carolina rather than relying on 
a sampling procedure that would narrow the scope of the study. 
Moreover, North Carolina has such a wide variation in demo-
graphic characteristics among school districts that this 
would allow us to comment on differences, if any, that 
resulted from school district size, regional geographic loca-
tion, or the rural or urban nature of the population. We 
did find, in the literature, that demographics explained 
variations in relationships between elected boards and profes-
sional administrators (Browne, 1985). Testing for these 
differences in board of education/superintendent relations 
was an effort deemed important, 
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As we sought to examine board of education/superinten-
dent relationships, we realized that the analysis could be 
approached from different perspectives. We could look at 
relationships from the perspective of members of the board of 
education or from the viewpoint of the professional adminis-
trator or even from the public's eye. We chose to utilize 
the superintendent's perspective for several reasons. Public 
schoo 1 superintendents have at least some common background 
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in their training to become school administrators. A large 
variety of factors enter into the creation of the superin-
tendent • s role and such a role has impact as actors enter into 
relationships {Park, 1976). Schools of education utilize, as 
a basis for study, a fairly common body of educational 
research and literature that implies certain behaviors for 
professionals in schools. This set of factors yields a more 
homogeneous background among school administrators as opposed 
to a more varied set of formative conditions having had an 
impact on lay board members. This difference in level of 
common experience between superintendents and members of the 
board of education as groups results in the likelihood of 
information from the superintendents' perspective being more 
generalizable. Data gathered from this more homogeneous pop-
ulation may well be more substantive than the more idiosyn-
cratic information yielded by the questioning of lay board 
members from a broad variety of backgrounds. Another consid-
eration that dictated our selection of the superintendents' 
perspective was a statistical/practical one. The number of 
superintendents that were to be surveyed was manageable, 
while the total number would have been increased by 5 to 
times were members of boards of education utilized. This 
large population of board members would have led us to sample 
only a selected group of board members. The theoretical 
concern with a sample of board members was whether a random 
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sample would accurately elicit the views of the total popu-
lation; sampling error would exist. Having a purposive 
sample raised the question of which board members would be 
appropriate to sample. To avoid this concern, we used all 
superintendents as our data base. 
Definition of Terms 
As we began our study with a review of the literature, 
many terms were defined in the context of the writings of 
scholars in the fields involved. We will formalize many of 
the aforementioned meanings in this section so that our use 
of these important terms will be clear. 
Public school finance, The process of providing for 
the assessed needs of public schools by the purposeful dis-
tribution of scarce resources. Two main elements exist in 
the process, with the first providing a procedure for devel-
oping school budgets. The second provides a system of fiscal 
control and accounting to protect board of education resources 
from misuse. In addition, it provides accounting information 
for measuring the effectiveness of the budget (Blake, 1980). 
Board of education. A corporate body and a legal entity. 
Members may possess independent thought and action but the 
board must act as a whole. Boards are given power by the 
political authority established under state constitutions 
and can govern only people put under their political control 
by the political parent. Members may be appointed or elected, 
and boards may be a combination of both (Blake, 1980). 
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Superintendent. The chief executive officer of a public 
school district. The superintendent is legally responsible 
to the board of education. 
Role. Behaviors exhibited when an individual puts the 
rights and responsibilities constituting status into effect. 
"Role" as a concept has been central to linking the function-
ing of elements of the social order with the characteristics 
and behavior of those who make it up (Park, 1976) • 
Relationship. Persons or groups of persons being mutually 
or reciprocally interested or connected. 
Perception. Awareness or understanding attained by 
direct or intuitive cognition. 
Mission. The organization 1 s philosophy, its thrust, the 
broad goals it sets for itself, and the things it chooses 
not to do (Svara, 1985). 
Policy. Middle range policy decisions, e.g., how to 
spend government revenues, whether to initiate new programs 
or create new offices, and how to distribute services at 
what levels within the existing range of services provided 
(Svara, 1985). 
Administration. Specific decisions, regulations, and 
practices employed to achieve policy objectives (Svara, 1985). 
Management. Actions taken to support the policy and 
administrative functions; includes controlling and utilizing 
the human, material, and informational services of the 
organization to best advantage (Svara, 1985). 
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Hypotheses 
As we began our examination of board of education/ 
superintendent relationships, we had several notions regarding 
expected results. These expectations were guided by the 
literature, especially that found in political science and 
educational administration, and by our experience and the 
experiences of others. These notions or expectations became 
our hypotheses. 
We felt that superintendents could be expected to have 
a different perception toward the responsibility of board 
members as opposed to their own responsibility in public 
school finance. The feeling was that superintendents would 
claim that they should have a greater number of responsibili-
ties, be more active, than should members of the board of 
education. Moreover, they would feel that these areas of 
activity should be arrayed across a broader number of dimen-
sions than should those of members of the board of education. 
The superintendents would believe that board members should 
have more general responsibility (policy) while they, the 
superintendents, would possess a far greater share of the 
specific (administration) duties surrounding the operation of 
the schools. The general result of this division of respon-
sibility would yield board members with a diminished role in 
the decision-making process involved in public school finance. 
Next, we believe that, based on the Svara model and the 
work of Zeigler, superintendents would recognize and delineate 
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multiple areas of responsibility that closely correspond to 
those identified in research on city manager/city council 
relationships. Rather than identifying a dichotomous rela-
tionship as was described in the early literature in the 
field, we expect to find that superintendents would see the 
relationship as less dichotomous and a more intertwined 
affair. Svara in examining city council/city manager 
relations identified four areas of action (mission, policy, 
administration, and management) rather than the traditional 
two (policy and administration), and we felt that there would 
be at least four in our study involving members of boards of 
education and superintendents. 
We also expected to find that the superintendents 
who were surveyed would feel that their own performance was 
very close to what it "ought to be" (Mead, 1934). Likewise, 
it was felt that the same superintendents would also feel 
that there was a gap between the performance of members of 
the board of education and what should be happening. The 
superintendent has a perception of the role of board members 
and that role differs from the board member's perception. It 
may well be that the difference is due to the board member 
not having a clear understanding of his/her role in public 
education .. This, in fact, seems to be a relatively rational 
assumption given the human condition, most persons feeling 
that they know what is appropriate while others remain 
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11 wrongminded" with regard to their ideas and actions. In 
our minds, superintendents would not be spared that human 
failing. There was nothing in the literature that suggested 
that superintendents would behave any differently than other 
individuals in this regard. 
While Browne was able to point up some regiona 1 dif-
ferences when comparing data gathered in Michigan with data 
gathered by Svara in North Carolina, we felt that there 
would be little or no difference in superintendents' percep-
tions across regions within our target state. In addition, 
we maintain that whether the school district is considered 
urban or rural and whether it is small or large in size will 
have no appreciable effect the perceptions held by its 
superintendent with regard to school finance and board of 
education/ superintendent relations. 
Data Source 
The instrument utilized in gathering data was a written 
survey (see Appendix B). The survey was designed to be dis-
tributed by mai 1 to all school district superintendents in 
North Carolina. The questionnaire contained 29 items that 
were created to solicit responses in the area of public 
school finance. The items were derived in two general ways. 
Some i terns were gleaned from the literature surrounding the 
area under study. Thus, some i terns were developed as a 
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result of ideas offered in general writings in school finance 
while others were taken directly from already existing 
surveys. The second source of statements was Svara 's 
research on city manager/city council relationships. Spe-
cific i terns from Svara • s work were used as they appeared, 
while others were altered to more closely resemble terminol-
ogy used in public school environments. These 29 items on 
public school finance were used with the expectation that 
they would tap the four dimensions in the Svara model. The 
specific activity and the appropriate dimensions are shown 
in Table 1. 
The focus of the instrument was to have the superinten-
dent identify levels of involvement on the 29 types of 
activity for both boards and themselves. Thus, each single 
activity was put to the respondent in four perspectives. 
The superintendent was asked to respond to the same item from 
the vantage point of what he/she felt was actually being done 
in practice by him/her as well as what level of involvement 
he/she felt ''should" be taken. Again, with the same item, 
the superintendent was asked what level of involvement his/ 
her board of education was taking on a specific activity and 
then what level they "should" be taking. On each item and 
for each perspective the respondent was instructed to rank 
"level of involvement" on a 5-point Likert scale. The follow-
ing categories of levels of involvement were utilized: 
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Table 1 
Questionnaire Items Categorized Using Svara' s 
Four Dimensions 
Mission 
Dec~d1ng whether to spend local monies on class size reduction. 
Deciding to participate in federal programs. 
Making decisions regarding the seeking of corporate funding 
for special projects. 
lni tia ting or cance 11 ing programs. 
Determining the purpose and scope of the system services 
provided. 
Developing annua 1 programs, goals, and object! ves. 
Policy 
Formulating the systemwide budget. 
Determining spending priori ties. 
Making recommendations for target budget figures. 
Budget review and approva 1. 
Creation of a district-wide capital outlay plan. 
Determining the level of fees. 
Increasing salaries from local monies. 
Deciding to hire outside consultants for curriculum develop-
ment. 
Assessing organizationa 1 performance. 
Deciding to undertake new or eliminate old services. 
Administration 
Advocating the approval of the annual budget before the county 
commissioners. 
Establishing procedures for the investment of cash reserves. 
Allocating funds for the maintenance of facilities. 
Allocation of capital funds. 
Awarding lage contracts. 
Determining formulas for the allocation of resources and 
services. 
Deciding to purchase district cars for particular personnel. 
Evaluating programs. 
Proposing changes in management practices or organization. 
Identifying problems, analyzing future trends for the 
district. 
Management 
Making the recommendation for budget change from one hour to 
the next. 
Routine contracting and purchasing. 
Developing applications for federal funding. 
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VERY LOW: NOT INVOLVED 
Handled entirely by someone else 
LOW: MINIMUM REVIEW OR REACTION APPROPRIATE TO THE SITUATION 
Giving a routine OK to someone else•s recommendations, 
providing an opportunity to react as a courtesy. 
MODERATE: ADVISING OR REVIEWING 
Making suggestions, reviewing recommendations, seeking 
information or clarification, ratifying proposals. 
HIGH: LEADING, GUIDING, OR PRESSURING 
Initiating, making proposals, advocating, promotion or 
opposing, intensely reviewing and revising a proposal. 
VERY HIGH: HANDLE ENTIRELY 
No one else directly involved. 
In addition to the ranking mentioned above, a section 
was included on the survey that was designed to gather 
demographic information. School district size, geographic 
location, designation of responsibilities in the area of 
finance, and the like were asked. 
The questionnaire was mailed to all 141 public school 
district superintendents in North Carolina. The first mailing 
contained a letter of explanation (see Appendix A) and a copy 
of the questionnaire. In 4 weeks, a follow-up letter (see 
Appendix A) was sent to the same superintendents asking that 
they return the survey if they had not already done so. 
In approximately 3 addi tiona 1 weeks, if the superintendent 
had not responded, a certified leter (see Appendix A), was 
mailed, along with another copy of the questionnaire, 
asking that he/she respond as soon as possible. After the 
tot a 1 process of seeking information ws completed, the number 
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of questionnaires returned was 131 for a total return rate of 
92%. Given the high response rate, it should not be surpris-
ing that the respondents represent a broad cross section of 
the state (see Table 2). Confidentiality of information was 
guaranteed to each respondent. 
Data Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, superintendents in the study were 
to respond to the 29 items from four perspectives: what the 
superintendent feels that he/she is actually doing, what 
he/she feels that he/she "ought" to do under the optimum 
conditions with no restraints, what he/she feels their own 
board of education is doing, and what he/she feels his/her 
board "ought" to be doing. These four perspectives form 
four subsets of data to be analyzed. For each of the four 
subsets, we wanted to test the data to determine if the four 
dimensions in the Svara model were present. To do this 
employed a multivariate analysis procedure known as factor 
analysis. 
Factor analysis is a statistical procedure that permits 
us to reduce a large body of data, which might be too complex 
to effectively study, into a more manageable form. At the 
same time, factor analysis permits us to uncover interrela-
tionships between variables that might have escaped a less 
thorough examination. Thus, the 29 items on our questonnaire 
will be statistically grouped into a smaller set of dimensions 
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Table 2 
Demographic Characteristics of Responding Superintendents' 
School Districts 
Geog:raphic Reg:ion Percentag:e 
Western North Carolina 21.5% 
Piedmont North Carolina 40.0% 
Eastern North Carolina 38.5% 
100.0% N 130a 
Overall Nature of Poeulation 
Urban 27.6% 
Rural 72.4% 
100.0% N 12 7 
School District Size 
0-1,499 8. 4% 
1, 500-4,999 43.5% 
5,000-9,999 26.7% 
10,000-14,999 12.2% 
15,000-24,999 5. 3% 
25.000-49.999 1. 5% 
50,000 and over ~ 
99.9% N 131 
aN does not always equal 131 due to missing data. 
bRounding error responsible for total not equaling 100%, 
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known as factors. These factors are assumed to be theoret-
ically linked as well as statistically related. If our 
hypothesis is correct, the 29 items should be grouped into 
four or more dimensions or factors. 
Once the factors have been determined one can create 
new variables. These new variables, factor scores, are 
the result of weights being assigned to the variables loading 
on the factors. These factor scores are analogous to scale 
scores for each respondent on each dimension. Thus, if four 
factors were delineated from the data, one would have four 
new variables for each respondent. 
Although there are many ways to use the factor analysis 
technique, the present research factors a data matrix consist-
ing of items across respondents (superintendents), so that 
factors will be groupings of items. After a principal 
component solution is c9mputed for the data (which tells 
the number of factors), the configuration from this stage is 
then further analyzed by an orthogonal rotation of the 
factors. Many statisti_cal options are available in factor 
analysis to determine the number of factors. Principal 
component analysis is the most commonly used procedure. A 
theoretical discussion of principal components analysis and 
the attendant procedures that result from the analysis is 
too complex to be covered in this paper. For an excellent 
explanation of factor analysis and the various options 
available see Rummel (1970). The factor matrix is then 
examined to characterize the factors on the basis of how 
each of the different items "load" or relate to it. This 
task assists in determining the substantive meaning of the 
factors. The factor meanings are important in telling 
the researcher how and why the i terns were important to the 
respondent. 
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In order to test the proximity of superintendents 1 per-
spectives on their own actual and preferred behavior as well 
as that of their boards, we ran a simple correlation between 
factor scores. A high correlation between two factors sig-
nifies a close relationship between the preferred and actual 
behavior. 
Finally, our analysis concludes with our comparing super-
intendent responses based upon a series of independent var-
iables. In order for us to do this we used analysis of 
variance. The dependent variables were our factor scores, 
while the independent variables were the demographic charac-
teristics collected in our questionnaire: school district 
size, geographic region, and the urban or rural nature of 
the population. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
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In order to begin to examine board of education/super-
intendent relationships, we looked at superintendents' 
perceptions of their own involvement and at the involvement 
of board members in the financial matters of their school 
districts. The 29 items on the questionnaire were subjec-
tively grouped into four categories approximating those 
created by Svara in his work with city manager/city council 
relationships. In order to make comparisons, we calculated 
the mean for each of the 29 items across the four subgroups 
(see Table 3). In addition, differences of means were 
calculated between actual and preferred performance for both 
superintendent and board of education member involvement. 
Levels of Involvement 
An examination of the data yielded several interesting 
findings. As one might expect, superintendents expressed a 
desire to have more involvement in 13 of 29 activities. On 
the other hand, Table 3 shows that superintendents preferred 
to have less involvement than they felt they actually have at 
present on 11 of the 29 activities. This was an unexpected 
finding. Interestingly enough, and contrary to what one 
might expect, in 22 of 29 activities the superintendents 
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Table 3 
Reseondents' Perceetion of Board and Sueerintendent Involvement 
in Financial Activities (Mean Scores} 
Sueerintendent Board 
Actual Preferred Diff. Actual Preferred Diff. 
Mission 
Spend local money for class size reduction* 3.96 4.05 .09 3.38 3.46 ,08 
Participate in federal programs 4.06 4.00 -.06** 3.26 3.35 .09 
Seek corporate funds 4.12 4.11 -.01 2.69 3.01 .32 
Initiate/cancel programs 4.16 4.14 0.02 2.93 3.12 .19 
Purpose and scope of services 4,05 4.08 .03 2.89 3.15 .26 
Develop annual goals and objectives 4.28 4.27 -.01 2.80 3,13 .33 
~ 
Formulate systemwide budget 4.13 4.13 3.16 3,20 .04 
Determine spending pr1orities 4.10 4.15 .05 3.28 3.28 0 
Determine target budget figures 4.17 4.20 .03 2.99 3.00 .01 
Budget review and approval 3.85 3.85 3.95 3,98 .03 
Distribution of capital outlay 4.DB 4.12 .04 3,56 3.67 .11 
Determine fee levels 3.82 3.78 -.04 3.59 3.64 .05 
Local salary increase from local money 3.89 3.95 .06 3.77 3.82 .05 
Hire outside curriculum consultant 4.25 4.29 .04 2.41 2.49 .08 
Assess organizational performance 4.20 4.16 -.04 3.19 3.45 ,26 
Eliminate old/undertake new services 4.12 4.06 -.06 2.98 3.22 .24 
Administration 
Advocate budget of county colllllissioners 4.Dl 3.g5 -.06 3.50 3.82 .31 
Invest cash reserves 4.44 4.39 -.05 2.07 2.21 .14 
Allocate funds for maintaining facilities 4.12 4.15 .03 3.02 2.92 -.10 
Allocate capital funds 4.01 4.09 .08 3.47 3.40 -.07 
Award large contracts 3.81 3.81 0 3.98 3.92 -.01 
Determine formulas for resource allocation 4.25 4.25 0 2.39 2.52 .13 
Purchase district cars 3.59 3.64 .05 3.59 3.5ll .05 
Evaluate programs 4.31 ll.31 2.60 2.95 .35 
Recolllllend changes in management 4.28 4.29 .01 2.71 2.72 ,01 
Identify problems/analyze future trends 4.18 4.19 .01 2.89 3.23 .34 
Management 
Make hour to hour budget changes 4.ll2 4.39 -.03 1.78 1. 7D -.DB 
Routine contracting/puchasi ng ll.liB 4.49 .01 1.84 1.77 -.07 
Deciding to apply for federal funds ll.52 ll.ll7 -.05 1.65 1.72 .05 
*See questionnaire in Appendix B for total wording of items. 
**Negative sign means less involvement preferred. 
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desired somewhat greater involvement by board members and in 
only 6 of 29 activities did they want less involvement. This 
tendency toward desiring a decreased involvement may well be 
indicative of the contention that school finance is a vola-
tile, pressure-prone area of public school manaagement. 
Care should be taken in making too much of this finding in 
that the differences involved were below the .25 level and 
considered insignificant. 
Interestingly, in only activity, making hour to 
hour changes in the budget, did the superintendent prefer 
both lessened involvement for the board members and for 
him/herself. This would make sense in that in every case 
excluding the aforementioned one, the superintendent preferred 
a lessening of involvement on his/her part and a contrasting 
increase on the part of board members. There was, however, 
no indication in the data that the sizes of the contrasting 
increases and decreases were equal or even near equal. If 
board members actually agreed with the superintendents' 
desires to increase the boards' involvement as the superin-
tendents' was decreased, the situation might well result 
in little or no conflict. Since the data was collected from 
the superintendents' perspective, there is no evidence that 
this would be the case in reality. On 27 of the 29 activities, 
the superintendent perceived that his/her involvement was 
actually greater than board members' involvement. In two 
86 
areas, budget review and approva 1 and the awarding of large 
contracts, this was not the case. In both cases, however, 
the gap was very small ( .10 and .12 respectively) and rela-
tively insignificant. Superintendents, then, perceive them-
selves as being more involved in the districts' financial 
matters than their boards of education. Likewise, only in 
the same two cases did superintendents express a perception 
that board members' involvement was preferred to be greater 
than their own. Again, superintendents obviously feel that 
they should be the leaders in the financial affairs of the 
district. However, in budget review and approval and in the 
awarding of large contracts, the superintendents would like 
to see greater involvement by boards of education. 
The superintendents 1 seeming desire to be more involved 
in the district 1 s financial matters than their boards is 
also indicated by generally higher mean scores for both the 
superintendent 1 s actual and preferred levels of involvement 
as opposed to the mean scores indicating the actual and pre-
ferred levels of involvement for board members. For board 
members who want a greater degree of control over the dis-
trict 1 s 11 purse strings, 11 this could easily be a serious point 
of conflict. 
one additional tendency is indicated in the data. There 
is a greater consistency in superintendents' perceptions 
of their own actual and preferred levels of involvement 
than that of board members. As mentioned earlier, in the 
case of superintendents, no differences between actual and 
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preferred levels of involvement, as perceived by superinten-
dents, were greater than .25. For board members, 7 of the 29 
activities had differences of .25 or greater perceived by the 
superintendent. Our data points to the contention that super-
intendents are simply more certain regarding their own roles 
as compared to the roles of their board members. 
While it is safe to say that our hypotheses that super-
intendents would perceive themselves as being more active in 
a greater number of financial activities is supported, 
another finding was revealed. Superintendents perceived 
board members as being far less involved, actual and pre-
ferred, on Svara 1 s categories '1Management 11 and "Administra-
tion" than on the categories of "Mission" and "Policy." 
While the categories of ]act~ vi ties were not empirically 
tested, the finding doei seem to lend credence to the appro-
priateness of svara 1 s model. The very lowest levels of 
desired involvement for board members were in the "Manage-
ment" area, exactly where the model would predict. However, 
the inverse is not so clear. If the same rationale is fol-
lowed and the model is an accurate representation of reality, 
levels of superintendent involvement should be lowest in the 
"Mission" area. This did not materialize as superintendents 
did not perceive themselves as either actually or preferring 
a decrease in involvement in this category. In other words, 
superintendents want high levels of involvement in all areas. 
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The findings support the hypothesis that superintendents 
would perceive that they would have higher levels of involve-
ment than board members in financial areas. Although the 
superintendents 1 perception of their own involvement is 
greater than that of board members, the data provides evidence 
that superintendents seek increased involvement on the part 
of boards. Finally, the data support the hypothesis that 
there would be greater congruence between superintendents' 
actua 1 and preferred behavior and less congruence for boards. 
Dimensions of Financial Reseonsibili ty 
Our next set of findings involved a test of our hypoth-
esis maintaining that the 29 financially related activities 
would be recognized by superintendents as being delineated 
into multiple areas of responsibility, rather than the tra-
ditional dichotomous policy versus administration division. 
We utilized the statistical procedure known as factor analysis 
to extract related areas or factors from the 29 financial 
activities. 
In order to verify the utility of factor analysis in 
this research application, we applied the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy as an index for comparing 
the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients to 
the magnitude of the partial correlation coefficients. 
Small KMO values would indicate that a factor analysis of 
the variables would not be a good idea, since correlations 
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between pairs of variables cannot be explained by the other 
variables. KMO values at or near .80 are seen as meritorious 
(Norusis, 1958) and, as can be seen in Table 4, such a value 
was achieved for each of our four data subsets. Factor 
ana lysis, then, was deemed a proper procedure for examination 
and analysis of the data collected. With such KMO values, 
we felt that we could comfortably proceed with the factor 
ana lysis. 
As we performed the factor ana lysis procedures, some 
variables did not "load" on any factor and, therefore, were 
deemed insignificant and were eliminated. In no case did 
the elimination of variables alter the number of factors or 
cause any significant chauge in the percentage of variance 
explained by the factors. Factors were extracted from each 
of the four dimensions (subgroups), actual involvement of 
the board, preferred involvement for the board, actua 1 invo 1 ve-
ment for the superintendent, and preferred involvement for 
the superintendent. Instead of the four areas of action 
described by Svara, seven factors were extracted in three 
separate ana lyses and six were extracted in another ana lysis. 
The number of variables involved in the factor analysis in 
each case ranged from 24 to the total complement of 29 (see 
Table 4). While the number of factors identified through 
the factor analysis was not identical to the four identified 
by svara in city council/city manager relations, our conten-
tion that a multiple, rather than dichotomous, relationship 
Table 4 
Evaluative Information on Factor Analyses 
Factors Variables 
Extracted in Factors 
Board Actua 1 7 factors 29 variables 
Board Preferred 7 factors 24 variables 
Superintendent Actual 6 factors 27 variables 
Superintendent Preferred 7 factors 26 variables 
I 
Percentage 
Variance Explained 
64% 
67% 
65% 
68% 
KMO 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
• 844 
• 790 
• 831 
• 790 
~ 
0 
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between factors would result was upheld. Superintendents 
did, in fact, perceive the relationship between activities as 
being more intertwined than a simple "policy versus admin-
istration" dichotomy. The clear-cut lines of the traditional 
dichotomy were not present in what superintendents saw as 
actual nor in what was preferred. 
An additional tool for testing the adequacy of the factor 
analysis to explain interrelationships between variables is 
to determine the percentage of variance explained by the 
factors. This is a measure of the extent to which the 
factors capture the variation in the way superintendents 
responded across the 29 items used. In all four subsets, 
the respective number of factors found were able to explain 
in excess of 60% of the variance. The range was 64% to 68% 
and such levels are considered substantial. Often, the 
remaining variance is considered the result of sampling or 
measurement error {Bailey, 1970). In sum, we feel comfortable 
that the factors uncovered capt.ure the essence of the rela-
tionships in the superintendents' perceptions. 
Our attention turns now to understanding the various 
factors that wer.e developed across each of the subgroups. 
Before we begin to interpret the meaning of the factors, 
we must make preliminary comments regarding how this will be 
done. In our study, the variables were considered to be 
loading on factors if they met a loading level criteria for 
significance of .40 or greater {Rummel, 1970). Variables 
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that did not meet this requirement for significance were 
considered to have failed to load on a factor. Those vari-
ables not having a loading of . 40 greater on any factor 
were omitted. The remaining variables were subjected to an 
additional factor analysis to assure that the interpretations 
were not prone to influence from extraneous variables. The 
next step in our analysis was, perhaps, the most important 
phase. It was during this phase that we were attempting to 
give meaning to the statistical analysis. For our purposes, 
we were attempting to simplify complex interrelationships in 
the data; thus, the meaning we give to the factors was more 
descriptive than causal. The labeling of the factors involves 
the creation of a name that best reflects the substance of 
variables having high loadings on the factor (Rummel, 1970). 
If all variables load similarly across the four subsets of 
data, labeling would be simple. However, the factor matrices 
for the four subsets were not exact and variables loaded 
differently on factors. Some factors that have similar names 
did not have identical variables but the essence of the 
factor was maintained. Some factors were discovered to exist 
in only one subset of data. This resulted from the variables 
loading differently in the four subsets and the different 
loadings implied different meaning. 
The factor analysis of superintendents 1 perceptions of 
the board 1 s actual involvement in our 29 financial activities 
9 3 
permits us to delineate areas of responsibility on the part 
of boards. In Table 5, seven factors are identified and given 
substantive labels. Those labels are goal setting, budget 
preparation, planning and evaluation, routine fiscal manage-
ment, operations and management, external fiscal matters, 
and budgetary decision-making. 
In Factor 1 several key activities, including "deter-
mining the scope and purpose of services," "formulation of 
the systemwide budget," "undertaking new and eliminating old 
services," and "developing annua 1 program goals and objec-
tives" led us to conclude that "goal-setting" was the focus 
of this factor. While some activities did not provide as 
appropriate a "fit," we felt that the general focus of the 
factor was centered on "goal-setting" and related activities. 
A second factor, "budget preparation," consists of activ-
ities that have at their heart the construction of a budget. 
Activities that exemplify this are the "allocation of funds" 
and the "determination 1of spending priori ties." 
The third factor, "planning and eva 1 uation," emphasizes 
analysis of current ativities and a future direction that is 
central to the process of planning. we label Factor 
"routine fiscal management" due to the day-to-day nature of 
the financial activities identified. Repetitive activities 
lacking in complexity form the basis of this factor. 
Table s 
Orthogonally Rotated Factors for Perceived Actual Board lnvolvement 
Undertake new/eliminate old services 
Evaluate programs 
Determine scope and purpose of services 
Develop annual program goals/objectives 
Approval of budget of commissioners 
Formulate systemwide budget 
Create district capital outlay plan 
Allocation of capital funds 
Allocation of maintenance funds 
Determine spending priorities 
Determine formulas for allocation of resources 
Establish procedures investing cash reserves 
Assess organizational performance 
Deciding to seek corporate funds 
Analyzing future trends 
initiating/cancelling programs 
Developing applications for federal funding 
Recommending hour/hour budget changes 
Routine contracting/purchasing 
Purchase district cars 
Budget review and approval 
Propose change in management and organization 
Determine fee levels 
Deciding federal program participation 
Deciding tfJ hire outside curriculum consultant 
Deciding to spend local money reducing class size 
Deciding t.o spend local money to incr<."ase salaries 
. , 
0 
Factor 1 
. 74296 
. 70262 
.65912 
.65548 
.62715 
.44449 
.40661 
' ~ 
.80812 
.68282 
.59630 
.45284 
.40633 
~ 
Factor 3 factor 4 
. 74217 
.63561 
.61505 
.52421 
.80703 
. 77260 
• 75887 
c , 
n 
o• 
• 70310 
• 65690 
.53144 
.793'>1 
.t.064l 
.51880 
~· 
....... tf' 
, .. 
ma> 
. 70247 
.54805 
Award large cont racls .434'13 
Recommend target budget. figures .414(,9 ~ o..o 
The highest loading for each variable is presented and only variables With .40 or qreat('r are used in the factor matrix. .:::. 
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Factor 5, "operations and management,., is composed of a 
diverse set of activities that range in scope from budget 
review to the purchasing of district cars. We feel that the 
label is descriptive of the diverse activities it represents 
but, admittedly, the "fit" on this factor is not as tight as 
in some other factors. In contrast, Factor 6, "external 
fiscal matters," contained activities that the label more 
closely describes. "Deciding on federal program participa-
tion," "the determination of fee levels," and "the hiring of 
outside curriculum consultants" are obviously external fiscal 
matters. Our final factor, Factor 7, was "budgetary decision-
making" and, like Factor 6, the activities that loaded on the 
factor were quite simildr in focus and emphasized decision-
making. 
In sum, areas where the board is actually involved span 
a variety of activities. In like manner, board preferred 
activities and actual and preferred activities for superin-
tendents encompass a broad range of activity. In Tables 6, 
7, and 8 we present the rotated factor matrices for the 
other three subsets. An examination across Tables 5 through 
reveals the fact that some labeled categories are in all 
four tables. The categories that run throughout are Planning 
and Evaluation, Budget Preparation, and Routine Fiscal Man-
agement. While not all variables in each table in the afore-
mentioned categories are the same, many are; and again we 
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Orthogonally Rotated Factors for Perceived Actua 1 Superintendent Involvement 
Analyzing future trends 
Evaluate programs 
Assess organizational performan-::e 
Determine scope and purpose of services 
Develop annual program goals/objectives 
Undertake new/eliminate old services 
Propose changes in management and organization 
Initiating/cancelling programs 
Award large contracts 
Deciding to spend local money reducing class size 
Budget review and approva 1 
Deciding to spend local money to increase salaries 
Determine fee levels 
Determine spending priorities 
Formulate systemwide annual budget 
Allocation of capital funds 
Approval of budget at commissioners 
Allocation of maintenance funds 
Recommend target budget figures 
Routine contracting/purchasing 
Developing applications for federal funding 
Deciding to hire outside curriculum consultant 
Deciding to seek corporate funds 
Deciding federal program participation 
Create district capit.al outlay plan 
Purchase district cars 
Determine formulas for allocation of resources 
0 
o• 
• 78089 
• 77978 
.69026 
.65166 
.64365 
.60857 
. 58036 
.50692 
~' 
00 
4.l·-<tr> 
0.0 
~0~ 
mo> 
. 70840 
• 70045 
.64689 
163832 
.61290 
o-. H . "0 
m "" 
Factor 3 Factor 4 
. 78205 
.63544 
.61330 
.61287 
.60605 
.(,0398 
.89409 
.83080 
0 
Factor 5 
.65186 
.60303 
.53414 
0 
0" 
"0 
00 ·-"< 
Factor 6 
. 72607 
.72329 
. 71035 
The highest loading for each variable is presented and only variables with .40 are used in the factor matrix. ~ _, 
Table 6 
Orthogonally Rotated Factors for Perceived Preferred Superintendent Involvement 
Analyzing future trends 
Evaluate programs 
Develop annual program goals/objectives 
Assess organizational performance 
lnitiatingtcancelling programs 
Propose changes in management and organization 
Undertake newfeliminate old services 
Deciding to hire outside curriculum consultant 
Determine scope and purpose of services 
Allocation of capital funds 
A llocaon of maintenance funds 
Formulate systemwide annual budget 
Determine spending priorities 
Routine contracting/purchasing 
Develop applications for federal funding 
Establish procedures investing cash reserves 
Award large contracts 
Budget review and approva 1 
Determine fee levels 
Deciding to spend loc;ol money reducing class size 
Deciding to spend local money to increase salaries 
Deciding to seek corporate funds 
Purchase district cars 
Determine formulas for allocation of resources 
Recommending hour/hour budget changes 
Approval of budget at commissioners 
c 
Ii 
0 
0 E . c , 
"u. 
-~. O·rl <U - C> 
""" Faclor I Factor 2 Factor 3 
.85538 
. 74589 
. 73772 
. 73196 
• 70884 
.677l8 
.67580 
.61288 
.60376 
.82871 
.76823 
.66173 
.6:,139 
.85150 
.83555 
.69115 
0 
c ~ 
~' 0 ~ 4 c ., Ql•rl c 
00 UD "" . ....... a- 4 ~~ 1-<o:l -IJE:" uc :J u Ql 5., 
00" 0 0 0'0 I: 
~u~ u-. 01-' "1j u 0 , .. 0 Ql .... Ql.... :JQI·.-t 
oo> ""0 0:.0: <llO:-iJ 
Factor: 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 
. 74189 
. 70114 
.51440 
.63513 
.60660 
.41054 
.81015 
.53540 
. 74648 
.4325) 
The highest loading for each variable is presented and only variables with .40 are used in the factor matrix. 
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have determined that the focus or essence of the category is 
intact. While this is a subjective judgment, it is based on 
the fact that the factor analysis has verified the majority 
of the factors being the same in each case. Two of the 
categories, External Fiscal Matters and Budgetary Decision-
Making, are present in three of the four subsets. As was 
the case with the examples discussed above, the essence of 
the categories is maintained although exact replication of 
variables does not result. 
While there are factors that run across the four subsets 
of data, there are also other factors that are unique within 
and among the four subsets. These unique factors are exem-
plified by Operations and Management in Table 5, Fiscal 
Planning in Table 6, and Local Resource Distribution in 
Table 7o These factors may have been the result of superin-
tendents' perceptions ob the activities being peculiar to the 
respective subsets o While the accomplishment of these acti v-
ities is no less important to the organization, there is 
considerable indecision in the perceptions of superintendents 
with regard to who should carry the responsibility of the 
activities 0 
Factor Congruence 
In Table 9, we compute the simple Pearson's "r" for 
both the superintendent's actual and preferred dimensions 
using factor scores o When high correlations between two 
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factors are the result, this is indicative of the superin-
tendent viewing the activities in like manner. Thus, in 
Table 9, the area of Planning and Evaluation shows a high 
correlation between the superintendent • s actual and preferred 
involvement and one can conclude that there is a high level 
of congruence between their actual and preferred behaviors on 
this factor. Likewise, low correlations would indicate low 
levels of congruence. Only significant correlations at the 
.001 level are reported in Table 9. The five factors that 
are common to the two subsets have high correlations on the 
respective factors. The factor entitled External Fiscal 
Matters, unique to the superintendents • actual involvement, 
correlates highly with the two factors unique to the super-
intendents 1 preferred behavior. As one can see in Table 9, 
we can conclude that superintendents "map" their actual and 
preferred actions in the same manner. 
In Table 10 the aforementioned process is followed for 
both the boards' actual and preferred involvement in financial 
matters. Again, high correlations are indicative of congru-
ence between actual and preferred behaviors. In contrast 
to the correlations for the superintendents 1 involvement, 
which exhibited a simple predictable pattern of like factors 
being correlated highly, the correlations for board involve-
ment form a more complex pattern. The area of responsibility 
"goal-setting" for the actual involvement of boards did not 
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correlate with any board preferred factors. This was a 
unique occurrence across all factors. Three other factors 
involving board actual activity are correlated with two or 
more board preferred factors. This may be the result of 
superintendents not having a clear conception of how to 
delineate board responsibility. For example, the area of 
responsibility entitled Operation and Management was posi-
tively correlated with Planning and Evaluation and Policy 
Development and yet negatively correlated with Long-Term 
Goa 1-Setting. These high positive correlations are the 
result of the variables loading on the Operation and Manage-
ment factor for board actual involvement and also loading 
on the board preferred factors, Planning and Evaluation 
and Policy Development. We are at a loss with regard to 
understanding the negative correlation between Operations and 
Management and Long-Term Goal-Setting. We are equally 
puzzled with regard to the unexpected positive loading of 
Planning and Evaluation with Long-Term Goal-Setting rather 
than with its respective board preferred factor. As one 
might expect, the two factors that are common to both 
subsets have high correlations. 
A comparison of the correlations across Tables 9 and 10 
reveals an interesting, yet not surprising, result. The 
generally higher correlations indicated between superin-
tendents' actual and preferred involvement as opposed to 
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those of the boards, indicates the superintendents perceiving 
a greater consistency in their own behaviors than those of 
the board. The fact that there is a gap in what superinten-
dents perceive the board is doing, and what they feel that 
they should be doing, is indicative of a situation that could 
lead to conflict. 
Determinants of Superintendents' Perceptions 
It was our contention that the perceptions of super-
intendents would not differ across the state of North Caro-
lina. Professional training, we felt, would create common 
value systems that would prevent variation among the state's 
chief school officers, We selected three characteristics 
in order to test our belief that socialization towards roles 
exists. Two of the variables, the urban/rural nature of 
the population and geographic region, could be considered 
to capture the basis of cultural differences in the state. 
If these major culture-creating characteristics do not 
elicit variance in superintendents' perceptions, then that 
enhances our contention that roles are well established. 
our third variable, student population (district size) 
might be expected to result in varying demands upon both 
superintendents and boards. In other words, superinten-
dents in large districts might be expected to feel very 
differently about many things than 1:.hose in small districts. 
If this were the case, there would be variance in the 
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superintendents' perceptions of the proper roles of both 
board members and themselves in financia 1 activities. Again, 
we believe that the socialization process is so influential 
that potential variance would be overcome. 
In Tables 11 and 12, we report the finding from a 
series of applications of analysis of variance procedures. 
The dependent variables were the computed factor scores for 
each superintendent across the 27 factors that were deter-
mined to exist. The independent variables were geographic 
region (East, Piedmont, and West), school district size 
(student populations of 0 to 1,499; 1,500 to 4,999; 5,000 
to 9,999; 10,000 and over), and the urban/rural nature of 
the population (as perceived by the superintendent). 
There is significant support in the data for our 
hypothesis that superintendents 1 perceptions would not vary 
across demographic diff~rences. In only 6 of the 81 instances 
were the F ratios found to be significant. District size 
was found to be importart only for the superintendents 1 
preference for increase? board involvement in Fiscal Planning. 
Superintendents from school districts of 1,500 to 4,999 
students wanted more involvement by boards than did superin-
tendents from districts of both smaller and larger districts. 
Geographic region also had little explanatory power. Super-
intendents in the eastern part of the st.ate perceived the 
board to be more involved in the Operations and Management 
Table 11 
Superintendents • Perceptions of Boards • Involvement in 
Financial Matters by Selected Demographic Characteristics 
(F Ratio) 
Board Actua 1 
Goal-Setting 
Budget Preparation 
Planning and Evaluation 
Routine Fiscal Management 
Operations and Management 
External Fiscal Matters 
Budgetary Decision-Making 
Board Preferred 
Planning and Evaluation 
External Fiscal Matters 
Routine Fiscal Management 
Budget Preparation 
Policy Development 
Long-Term Goal-Setting 
Fiscal Planning 
District 
Size 
1.013 
• 512 
1.473 
• 402 
2.118 
l. 731 
• 568 
• 828 
l. 875 
.428 
• 659 
• 235 
.315 
3. 249* 
Geographic Urban 
Region Rural 
2.126 6.894* 
• 846 7.927* 
• 645 1. 458 
.117 l. 879 
3. 326* .019 
1.149 .188 
2.585 • 003 
.848 2. 317 
2.297 .135 
.167 1.512 
.278 3. 755 
2.169 .462 
.055 .114 
.366 l. 375 
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*Indicates an F ratio significant at the • 05 level or greater. 
107 
Table 12 
Superintendents' Perceptions of Superintendents' Involvement 
in Financial Matters by Selected Demographic Characteristics 
(F Ratio) 
Superintendent Actual 
Planning and Evaluation 
Budgetary Decision-Making 
Budget Preparation 
Routine Fiscal Management 
Fiscal Matters 
Resource Allocation 
Superintendent Preferred 
Planning and Evaluation 
Budget Preparation 
Routine Fiscal Management 
Budgetary Decision-Making 
District 
Size 
• 780 
l. 286 
• 891 
• 256 
l. 509 
2.101 
• 596 
• 210 
l. 255 
• 56 4 
Local Resource Distribution .1 76 
Resource Allocation 2. 569 
Budget Recommendation • 529 
Geographic Urban 
Region Rura 1 
2. 572 • 528 
. 830 • 333 
2. 013 .!31 
!.166 • 452 
l. 058 . 398 
• 916 2. 001 
3. 5 79 * • 284 
l. 096 .073 
• 627 • 056 
l. 616 • 303 
. 778 • 767 
1. 778 4 .816* 
• 789 • 551 
*Indicates an F ratio significant at the .05 level or greater. 
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area than did other superintendents. Interestingly enough, 
the superintendents in the western part of the state actually 
wanted less involvement for themselves in Planning and 
Evaluation. Urban/rural differences explained variation in 
perceptions in three areas of responsibility. Superintendents 
from urban districts perceived boards as being more involved 
in Goal-Setting and less involved in Budget Preparation than 
their rura 1 counterparts. Urban superintendents wanted more 
involvement in Resource Allocation. We are cautious to make 
too much of these, possibly idiosyncratic, findings. The 
paucity of significant differences is indicative of the 
common perceptions held by superintendents towards their 
involvement in financial matters as well as that of boards. 
A Test of the Svara Mode 1 
Our attention now turns to understanding the multiple 
areas of responsibility that we have determined to exist 
for boards and superintendents in light of the Svara model. 
In Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7, we depict the set of factors for 
each of the respective subsets across the categories of the 
Svara model. The horizontal bars represent the number of 
variables ascribed to the Svara category that load on a 
factor. The broken lines indicate an absence of a variable 
or a number of variables loading on that factor and serve 
to link variables spanning categories. 
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Inspection of the four figures lends some credence to 
the applicability of the Svara model in public school finan-
cial activities. As one might expect, there are only very 
few factors which fall within a single Svara category. 
Equally as important is the fact that three of the four 
single category factors are in the "Management" area (the 
fourth is in "Administration") as Svara • s model would pre-
dict. On the other hand, the expectation does not hold at 
the opposite extreme of Svara's model. There is no area of 
responsibility that falls solely in the "Mission" category. 
As can be seen in Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7, the roles of 
the superintendent and of the board in financial matters are 
not neatly delineated. For 23 of the 27 areas of respon-
sibility, across all four subsets of data, the factors span 
two or more Svara categories, in eight instances spanning 
three. The spanning of categories by factors graphically 
portrays a meshing of board and superintendent responsi-
bilities as would be predicted from the model. Thus, the 
superintendents' perceptions of their role and those of 
board members are intertwined into complex relationships 
rather than into distinct dichotomous functions. Moreover, 
with this mixing of functions, the potential for conflict 
increases. As a result, it should be no surprise that the 
literature is replete with discussions of conflict between 
superintendents and their boards of education. 
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Summary 
In this chapter we set out to test four hypotheses using a 
variety of statistical procedures. The data supported our 
contention of greater involvement by superintendents as 
opposed to boards. The analysis also uncovered multiple 
factors across the four subsets of data. Substantive mean-
ing was given to these factors and they provided a better 
understanding of board and superintendent roles in financial 
activities. There was greater congruence in superintendents' 
dimensions than for boards. There were little to no dif-
ferences uncovered among superintendents' perceptions when 
applying the three demographic independent variables. 
Finally, the data seem to support the applicability of the 
Svara model to board/superintendent relations. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Summary 
we began our study with comments regarding the basis 
for the primary goal of American public schools. The 
American desire to offer an appropriate public education 
to all its children is at the center of the national 
!15 
conscience as well as being at the center of its own inter-
est. In order to administer the requirements of the national 
democratic tradition, America must have a literate, polit-
ically socialized citizenry, and schools have been the target 
institution for its creation. In short, America • s schools 
are the major purveyor of its political ideals and those 
ideals are central to what we described earlier as the 
American 11 way of life.'' Out of democratic ideals came the 
goal of representative democracy, and out of representative 
democracy came the lay/professional partnership that sym-
bolizes American public education. Simply put, the people 
wanted influence over their children's education; thus 
the nation's schools began with direct control by the people. 
However, as the educational endeavor became more complex, 
both in the numbers of children being served and in the 
responsibilities being given the schools by the people, there 
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was a need for a professional educator, an administrator who 
could dire~t the operation of the schools. The basis for 
our study was set; boards and superintendents are the "key 
actors'' in public education. 
The history of public education has been a chronicle of 
issues surrounding the control of schools and what they impart 
to students. The seat of that control has changed over the 
years and, in many ways, the competition for control of 
influence has passed through 11 phases" (Zeigler, 1974). This 
desire to control has created the issue that we have attempted 
to study. We elected to study the relationships of boards 
of education and superintendents in the area of school finance. 
School finance was chosen due to its important role as a 
facilitator of much of what happens in schools and because 
of its relative importance in the educational literature. 
We found, quickly, that little theoretical analysis has been 
attempted in school finance although the literature was 
replete with the varying opinions on the topic. 
Relationships were the focus of our study, and it was 
necessary to develop ways to understand them. This led to 
our analysis of roles and role theory as a basis for explain-
ing the dynamics involved in the interaciton between boards 
and superintendents. The views of sociologists such as Park, 
Mead, Moreno, and Linton were examined as we sought to gain 
understanding of the interaction between elected (also 
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appointed) officials and administrators. The work of Goffman 
on "presentation of self" was utilized as a way to look at 
how each of us is perceived by others, this being importanat 
due to the fact that our study is based on the perceptions 
of public school superintendents. Goff man provides aid in 
understanding how others relate to us and it is his contention 
that it has little to do with what we think we are but what 
others perceive us to be. 
The literature also offered theoretical understandings 
of how boards of education and superintendents interacted 
over the years. While the "harmony model" is not the creation 
of any one individual, it is a widely discussed idea. 
According to this model, boards and superintendents should, 
at a 11 costs, try to "get a long." Proponents of the mode 1 
agree on its existence, but not on the reasons for its 
development. Many saw the goal of the harmony model as 
simply an attempt to do the best for children by avoiding 
tension and high levels
1 
of emotion; other authors saw the 
model as a way for superintendents to "get their way" by 
pressuring the board into acquiescence. This variance in 
interpretation could, obviously, result in considerable dis-
agreement and conflict. Another prevalent theory on how 
boards and superintendents should interact is the policy/ 
administration dichotomy model. This model would have 
boards sticking to the formation of policy, while allowing 
the administration to "run the schools." Failure to do this 
liB 
is generally seen, by the administration, as a board mistake 
that can be corrected simply by advising boards of their 
appropriate task. This clear delineation of responsibility 
was, of course, unrealistic. We found it doubtful that such 
a division of responsibilities could be achieved. Svara 
provided an alternate model that became a focus for a good 
deal of our research. He suggested a meshing of responsi-
bility across four categories that extended from defining 
the mission of the organization to day-to-day operations of a 
schoo 1 system. 
Our research was accomplished through the distribution of 
a questionnaire to all local school district superintendents 
throughout the state of North Carolina. The questionnaire 
contained 29 items that were focused on financial responsi-
bilities in school districts. Superintendents were asked 
to rank perceived level of involvement (actual and preferred) 
in financial activities for both themselves and boards. 
The return rate for the survey was in excess of 90% and, we 
feel, indicates a real interest in such matters by superin-
tendents. The high response rate permits us to have confi-
dence in the data collected. 
The data collected were utilized to test four hypotheses. 
These were: 
--Superintendents will have a different perception 
towards their own responsibility in public school 
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finance than towards that of board members. They 
will see themselves as more active in more areas of 
financial responsibility. 
--Superintendents will perceive their own performance 
as being closer to what it "ought to be" than the 
performance of board members. 
--Superintendents will delineate multiple areas of 
responsibility in school finance rather than creating 
a dichotomous division. 
--There will be no difference in the perceptions of 
superintendents in financial matters when considering 
three selected demographic characteristics, 
The data were analyzed using a variety of statistical pro-
cedures including factor analysis, analysis of variance, and 
the computation of both correlation coefficients and measures 
of sampling adequacy. 
our analysis revealed that superintendents do, in fact, 
perceive greater, as well as broader, involvement on their 
part as opposed to that of board members. The superinten-
dents 1 levels of involvement were substantially higher, both 
actual and preferred, across 27 of 29 activities than those 
of board members. It is evident that superintendents feel 
that the leadership of financial matters within the school 
district should remain largely in their hands. 
In our analysis, the policy/administratiqn dichotomy 
not evident1 rather, multiple areas of responsibility 
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were identified in public school financial matters. While 
svara' s model suggested four areas, our research identified 
seven areas in three analyses and six in another. Thus, 
the hypothesis regarding superintendents' delineating 
multiple areas of responsibility was supported. 
Two different approaches were used to explore our 
hypotheses that superintendents would have a clearer per-
ception of their role than that of board members. First, we 
looked at differences in mean scores for actual and preferred 
involvement. There were fewer differences of any magnitude 
with regard to superintendent involvement compared to that of 
boards. In addition, correlation coefficients computed for 
both the boards' and the superintendents' involvement showed 
that superintendents perceive themselves being closer to 
doing what "ought to be done" than their board members. This 
identifies a significant possibility for board/superintendent 
conflict. 
Finally, we maintained that little or no difference 
would be identified in superintendents' perceptions across 
three selected demographic characteristics. This hypothesis 
was supported by our analysis. In only 6 of 81 cases were 
any statistically significant differences indicated. 
While our four hypotheses were supported, our research 
revealed another interesting result. Utili zing factor scores, 
we constructed a test of svara 1 s model. We found that there 
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was credibility in the svara model for superintendents and 
boards of education as well as for city managers and city 
councilsa The test showed a meshing of board and superin-
tendent responsibilities as does the Svara model. This 
meshing, or lack of distinct delineation in role, could, of 
course, be a real source of conflict. 
Conclusions 
This study was undertaken because of the vital roles 
of both boards and superintendents with regard to what takes 
place in America's schools. The tension and conflict that 
take place between superintendents and boards must be properly 
channeled if America's children are to benefit. In order 
to resolve conflict or to channel it in a positive direction, 
we must arrive at an increased understanding of the way boards 
and superintendents view themselves and each other, in that 
these perceptions will determine whether these 11 key actors 11 
can work together for the benefit of the nation's students. 
In addition, board members and superintendents must learn to 
work within the political context that is the reality of 
today' s educational process. To assume that this can be 
avoided is simply to be ineffective for the young people that 
are to be served. 
The literature and experience tell us that conflict is 
present, and we have concluded that the varying expectations 
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of role and behaviors held between boards and superintendents 
could be a primary source of dissension and conflict. We have 
found that the responsibilities of board members and super-
intendents are not clearly delineated, as if one's respon-
sibility simply stops where the other's begins. we have 
seen that the perceptions of one group will not, most 
likely, be the same as that of another, yielding still 
another source of conflict. 
However, in addition to what we have seen that stands 
in the way of good board/superintendent relationships, we 
have also found that sense can be made of what boards and 
superintendents do and why they do it. This understanding 
through effort and awareness of the limitations of the 
processes involved, rather than a denial of the realities, 
can lead to improved relationships. Improved relationships, 
in turn, can lead to an educational process that will be the 
very best for America's students. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
As we attempt to provide links to the research that 
remains yet undone on the relationships between boards of 
education and public school superintendents, we readily admit 
that our study has been subject to limitations. Our limited 
time and our ability have left important stones unturned, 
and we hope that there will be those who come after us to 
continue to explore what we see as an extremely important 
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aspect of public school education. We chose element 
that we felt would be an important beginning in the search 
for greater understanding of the profoundly political process 
that has such great bearing on the lives of our children. 
We approached that element for study with methods that were 
also limited, researchers never being able to explore every 
blind alley that may lead to the very best discovery. We 
have simply been explorers and we hope that other explorers 
will follow. 
The board of education/superintendent relationship is 
complex and cannot be fully understood from any single study. 
We would like to suggest several aspects of such relationships 
that deserve further study. 
Due to the fact that Browne found variance in Svara' s 
model involving city manager/city council relationships, 
a similar replication should take place in our study of 
boards and superintende+ts. Such replication from another 
area of the nation mighJ well provide valuable information 
regarding the transferability of the findings revealed in our 
study. 
We utilized superintendents' perceptions in looking at 
board/superintendent relationships. While we are convinced 
that there were adequate reasons for limiting our study to 
superintendents' perceptions, it would be interesting to 
determine if board members, with their different perspective, 
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would yield results that vary significantly in the support 
of our hypotheses and resulting claims. The study should, 
then, be replicated from the board members' viewpoint. Con-
sideration should even be given for a replication from the 
viewpoint of members of the community. Each of these attempts 
would have its attendant disadvantages, both in research 
methodology as well as in practical considerations. 
School board/superintendent relationships should also 
be examined in some area in addition to that of school 
finance. While finance is an important aspect of school 
operation, other areas might well produce varying opinions 
from the respondents. For example, in the area of curriculum 
which is traditionally reserved for the professional, would 
board members have a very different perspective? Research in 
additional areas could very well broaden the work that we 
have been able to do in this study. 
Our study involved an investigation based on the percep-
tions of superintendents. Further study on board/superin-
tendent relationships could be based in a totally different 
direction. Relationships could be studied in a more inves-
tigative fashion with observations being made when board 
members and the superintendent meet to carry on the business 
of the school district. Analysis could be done on the types 
of interactions that take place between the "key actors" and 
might result in the discovery of flaws in communications 
that result in poor relationships. 
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Our study has been empirical in nature, but there are 
many types of analysis that are more qualitative which could 
be utilized in studying the relationships between boards and 
superintendents. Lightfoot used a qualitative, interpretive 
approach to looking at educational environments entitled 
"portraiture" (Lightfoot, 1983). Lightfoot studied American 
high schools by visiting schools for a 3- to 4-day period and 
collecting data through observation. The descriptive data 
was used to capture the lives, rhythms, and rituals of those 
observed. These techniques of observation, interviewing, and 
ethnographic description were used to create the "portraits" 
that were the result of the research. Goodlad combined 
the less empirical observation with a collection of accom-
panying statistical data to accomplish his study of public 
schools (Goodlad, 1984). The appropriate methodologies are 
legion and the possibilities seemingly endless. 
Both boards of education and superintendents are impor-
tant. In order for children to be best served, levels of 
effectiveness must be maximized. Understanding is the answer; 
we must seek it. 
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APPENDIX A 
LETTERS TO SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AT GREENSBORO 
Center fnr Social Re~earrh and Human Sen,ices 
December 9, 1985 
Dear 
Public school budgeting and finance has always been a powerful issue 
in the United States. In recent years, as the economy has fluctuated and 
as funding for education has decreased while demands for services have 
increased, the issue of how to properly finance the public education en-
deavo!' has often been a popular topic of discussion. As a public school 
superintendent, you are in a unique position to comment on the status of 
public school finance and the issuas surrounding the budgeting process. 
I a."!l hoping that, as an element of my doctoral studies and in cooperation 
with the Center for Social Research at the University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro, you will complete the enclosed questionnaire. We feel· that 
your responses will help to clarify various issues surrounding the financing 
of public schools. 
Please be assured that all individual responses will be held confidential. 
Results tdll only be reported in such a way as to a·void the identification 
of individual superintendents or school districts. If you desire a copy cf 
the results, please put your name and address on the back of rhe returr:. 
e=tvclo?e: no't on tt:.e GUeztivrulaire, The .::nve.lvp~ e:m:los.;d fo:: ~he r~t'.!:::-r. 
of the questicnnaire is addressed and stamped for your convenience and 
ease of return. 
If you have any questions or concerns please call collect (919) 274-9610 
between the hours of 5:00 p·,:n. and 11:00 p.m. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
~R:md 
Encls. 
Sincerely. 
Michael T. Renn 
GREENSBORO, NORTH CAilOLTNA/274l~~.i001 
THE L'NIVERSllY OF NORTH CAROLINA ;, compowl of r~• ,;..,,.. f>Mblie rnior i•olil~ri••• i• Nc•t~ C~•oliu 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AT GREENSBORO 
Center for Sr>eia/ Re.>ean.'h and Human Sudrrs 
January l3, 1986 
Dear 
Before the holidays, I wrote to you seeking your opinion on public school 
finance in our state. If you have already completed and returned the questionnaire~ 
please accept my sincere thanks. If not, I ask that you please do so at your 
earliest convenience. 
This study has been undertaken because we believe that the effective financing 
of public education is extremely important for the children of North Carolina. \•le 
feel that when all the questionnaires are in and the data is analyzed we ~:~ill be 
able to better understand the funding process. In order for the study to accurately 
reflect the broadest possible range of superintendents' opinions, it is very impor-
tant that we receive your responses. 
Your assistance is greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
~lTR/an Michael T. Renn 
GREENSDORO, NORTH CAROL!NA/27412-5001 
THE l'NIVERSLTY OF NORTH C.'\ROLII'JA is to..,~oud o/ l~t oi>ltu ~wbUt ouio1 i•Hil•ll"o•s ,·. No,rA C~•olioa 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AT GREENSBORO 
Center for Social Research and Human Services February 11, 1986 
Dear -------------
Several weeks ago, we wrote to you seeking your opinion on 
public school finance issues. To date, we have receh·ed a 
significant number of surveysj in fact, over 60 percent of the 
questionnaires have been returned. However, our goal is are-
sponse rate of 100 percent. Because the issues discussed are 
so very important to public education, want to have all the 
Superintendents return the survey. 
We know that you, as a Superintendent, help shape the 
state's policy toward education. Thus, your current views 
public school finances are extremely important. This is 
especially true this next year with Federal budg'<!t cuts and other 
significant cross-pressures on the state budget. 
Our research is designed to help understand how Boards and 
Superintendents work together in the budget process; therefore, 
your assessment of this process is very important. If you have a 
good working relationship, then our research will help you 
understand why. If you feel that the relationship between Board 
and Superintendent could be better, then our results should 
provide you with some immediate benefit$ nn how ta better work 
with the Board. In either case, your opinions are extremely 
important. 
We feel so strongly in seeking each Superintendent's 
opinions on the issues discussed in the survey that we sent this 
reminder to you by certified mail--we wanted to ensure its 
delivery. In case your earlier copy of the questionnaire has 
been misplaced, we have enclosed a replacement. 
GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA/27412-SOOI 
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May I also remind you that you can receive a copy of the 
results by simply writing, "copy of results requested," on the 
back of the return envelope, along with your name and address. 
MTR :md 
Enclosures 
Sincerely, 
Mic.hael T. Renn 
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As the superintendent of a publle sc:hool dhtrie.t you work with a Board of Educa-
tion to provide for the financing of public instruction. Below, we have listed va-
rious activttiea that are often auoclate<l with school and progrlllll planning and 
.tueument. for each &c:tivity listed, please indi<:;ate the actual And preferred level of 
Board involvement, either u a whole or u individu&l members, and the actual .and 
preferred level of aupertntendent/1taff involvement. It h possible that both the 
Board &m! the superintendent will be vary ilwolv"d or have little involvement in the 
same activity. An explanation of the categories h offered below. 
Categoriu of Leveh of Involvement 
l. VERY LOW: NOT INVOLVED 
Handled entirely by aomeone eln 
2. LOW: HINIHtiH REVIEW OR REACTION APPROPRIATE TO THE SitUATION 
Giving a routine OK to someone ehe' 1 reco11111endatiON', 
providing an opportunity to react aa a courtesy 
3. MODERATE: ADVISING OR REVIEWING 
Making suggeetiona, reviewing reco1111111ndattons, seeking 
information or !:larification, ratifying proposals 
4. HIGH: LEADING, GUIDING, OR PRESSURING 
Initiating, making proposals, advoeating, promotion or 
opposing, intennly reviewing and reviling a proposal 
S. VERY HIGH: HANDLE ENTIRELY 
No one else directly involved 
Preferred Level of Involvement 
Whatever the level of Involvement, there may be a differing degree of satisfaction 
with that level. For example, one person may be pleased to not be involved in an 
activity and another person displeased. Therefore, choose the appropriate number for 
the actual level of involvement, and then circle the same or a different number on 
the seale that reflects the level of involvement you prefer for either the Board or 
S"perintendent/Staff. 
Cirele the numbllr for "aetual"involvement and th11 number for "preferred" involvement 
for both the Soard and the Superintendent/Staff. 
Board Supt/StaH 
1. Formulating the system wide 4 
annual b"dget Prefer l 4 
2. Advocating the approval of "' l 4 annual budget before the county Prefer l 4 
eon1nissioners 
l. Determing spending priorities Actual l 4 
Prefer ' 4 
4. Establishing proced .. rea '" l ,,. investlnent of caah reserves Prefer l 4 
;. t1aki11g the recommendation for Aet .. al l 4 
budget ehange from one hour <o Prefer l 4 
the next 
6. Allocating funds for maintenanee Actual 
of faeilitiea Prefer 
'· Allocation of eapital funds Actual l 4 l 4 Prefer l 4 l 
'· Awarding largeco11tracts Prefer 
'· itoutine contracting and Actual l 4 purchasing ) 4 
10, ~aking recommendations '" Ac ~ua 1 target b1.1dget Hgures Prefer 
13 7 
Supt/Staf:' 
11. Budget review and approval Ac:tual 
Prefer 
12. Dec:icling whether to spend Actual 
loc:al monies on elan size Prefer 
recluc:tion 
13. Creation of a district-wide Ac:tual 
c:apital outlay plan Prefer 
14. Determining formulae for "' Ac:tual alloc:ation of ruoureu and Prefer 
15. Deciding to participate io Ac:tud 
federal programs Prefer 
1&. Developing application.~ '" Actual federal fl.tnding Prefer 
17. Making decisions regarding Ac:tual 
"' seeking of corporate Prefer funding for spec:ial projects 
18. Determining "' level of fees Actual Prefer 
19. Increasing salaries fr<lm loc:al Actual 3 4 
mentes Prefer 3 4 
"· Deciding to hire outside consul- 3 4 5 tants for eurrieulum development 3 4 5 
21. Dec:iding to purchase district Actual 3 4 5 3 4 5 
car" for particular personnel 3 4 5 3 4 5 
"· Auening organization per- 4 5 formanee Prefer 4 5 
23. Initiating or eam:elling pro- Aetual 
Prefer 
24. Evaluating programs 3 4 5 
Prefer 3 4 5 
25. Determining the purpose 
•md scope of "' sy!tem Prefer services provided 
"· Proposing ehangu in manage- Actual ment practices or organization 
"· !dentifying problems, analyzing 3 4 5 future trends fo• the district 3 4 5 
28. Developing annual program Actual 3 4 
80als and obje<:tivu Prefer 3 
"· Deciding to undertake new " eliminate old services (not simple change lo level) 
Pleaaa provida tha nquaatad information "lth rasard to :rour individ~~al aituation 
by circlln• tha appropriata anaver or UlUns in tha blanlr.a balow. 
I, I fall that the ovarall natura of sy achool dlltrict h 1, Urban 
2, lurll 
z. GaoJI'aphically, .,. acbool dhtrlct h locatad in 
3. The population of the largeat =nicipality 
in II.)' achool diatrict h 
1. W.atarn II,C, 
Z, P1acDont H.C, 
1. 0 - 5,000 
z. 5,000- 10,000 
J. 10,000 - SO,OOO 
4, 50,000 - 100,000 
5, OVar 100,000 
4. Th.a Board of Education in my achool dhtrlct la 1. Appointad 
If appointad, by wh0111? 
5. 1'ha nlllllbar of atudentl in my diatrict 11: 
z. Elected 
1. 0 - 1,499 
z. 2,500- 4,999 
3. 5,000 - 9,999 
4. 10,000 - 14,999 
s. 15,000- 24,999 
6. 25,000 • 49,000 
7, 50 1000 and OVal' 
6. Do you feel that you ara reaponaibh for the budgeting 
and Uacll lllltttr• for tha achool dhtrict 
1. \'ea 
2. No 
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7, Do you employ sOIIHionl who dlneu the dsy•to•day 
financial lllll.tUn of the school diltrict 1. Yes 
2. No 
z. helet.nt SUPfl'lntendent levsl politlon 
3, Dlre~:tor level po•ltlon 
4, llMftf:l Offlt:ll' 
5. Othu ---------
8. Ths psreon who directs the d•y•to·d•y 
ftn1nctsl ~~~&tters of the cl.tst:rlct is 
1. A proteui~:~nal educator 
z. A person t:ralned ln 
buslne .. , sccoun t1 n; , 
fln.nce, etc, :rather 
than an educator 
3. Other 
l'Mnk you tor yaur co~:~peratlon. lie would. appreciate any acl.cl.ition.al c-nts 
you 1111)' tt.ve on the flnsncins of public: sc:h~:~~:~l educ:eti~:~n o:r in how sc:h~:~ol dhtrleu 
tn North CsroUn. bud;et. Plene use the epsc:e below? 
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